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ISN'T IT A CRIME: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON SPOUSAL IMMUNITY AND SPOUSAL
VIOLENCE
Malinda L. Seymore*
His hands, they never hit me sober
His hands, they never marked my face
I would rather be blind
than see him treat me that way
I would rather be deaf than hear that sound
Like a pistol cracking
as the spirit breaks
and love comes tumbling down.
Janis Ian
"His Hands" from "Breaking Silence"
The epidemic of spousal abuse has garnered considerable atten-
tion since John Stuart Mill railed against men "little higher than
brutes" who were able to obtain a ready victim "through the laws of
marriage."' Americans today have "'discovered' family violence in
the sense that Columbus 'discovered' America, although the discovery
was no news to those who already lived there."'2 Despite this atten-
tion, the epidemic grows.
Much has been written about the reluctance of police to arrest in
domestic violence cases3 and the reluctance of the state to prosecute
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., 1986, cum
laude, Baylor University School of Law; B.A., 1982, Rice University. I am indebted to Chief
Justice Linda Thomas and her Briefing Attorney John Adcock, Dallas Court of Appeals, and my
colleagues Stephen Alton, Frank Elliott, James Hambleton, Dennis Olson, and Deborah Wake-
field for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft. In addition, I must acknowledge
the valuable work of James Evans and Marina Mata-de Ia Garza, my student research assistants.
I would also like to thank my Spring 1995 Feminist Jurisprudence Seminar students, whose lively
discussions of this topic motivated my work, and former FemJur students Judith Kuhn Alton,
Susan French Ferguson, and Linda Prichard, whose editorial comments were invaluable. I am
grateful for the support of the Law School, especially for the award of a summer research grant
that allowed me to spend considerable time on this project.
1 JOHN S. MILL, THE SUBncON OF WOMEN 37-38 (Susan M. Okin ed., 1988) (3d ed.
1870).
2 DONALD G. DUTFON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE PERsPECITrsa at ix (1995).
3 Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and
Gender in Domestic violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171 (1994); Gary M. Bishop,
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such cases.4 Part of that reluctance may be caused by prevalent socie-
tal attitudes that diminish the importance of spousal violence. In a
number of jurisdictions, the reluctance to pursue criminal sanctions
against married abusers is caused by the difficulty of procuring the
battered spouses' testimony.5 In those jurisdictions, the prosecutor
cannot compel a reluctant spouse's testimony because of the spousal
privilege not to testify against a defendant spouse. Even in jurisdic-
tions that have some exceptions to the privilege, including spousal vio-
lence exceptions, the prosecuting authority may find it legally, as well
as practically difficult to procure the spouse's testimony.
Consider the following fact situations, all of which depict typical
patterns of wife abuse:6
(a) Sue's husband Abner accuses her of infidelity and telephones the
man he believes to be her lover, insisting that he come over and discuss
the matter. The three sit together in a car, and during the discussion
Abner pulls out a revolver and shoots the other man in the temple. He
then points the gun at Sue, threatening to kill her if she tries to get away.
He drives aimlessly until the car runs out of gas. Abner is charged with
murder of the supposed lover and kidnapping of Sue. Sue, the only wit-
ness, is reluctant to testify.7
(b) After Raymond hits his wife, she obtains a protective order against
Raymond, prohibiting him from visiting or approaching her at her resi-
Note, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction,
30 B.C. L. REv. 1357 (1989); Carolyne R. Hathaway, Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in
Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEo. L.J. 667 (1987); Lauren
L. McFarlane, Note, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When the Police Will
Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 929 (1991); Sue E. Schuerman, Note, Establishing a
Tort Duty for Police Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence, 34 Aiuz. L. REv. 355 (1992);
Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1498
(1993)[hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Violence].
4 Jane W. Ellis, Prosecutorial Discretion to Charge in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Dialogue,
75 J. Craum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 56 (1984); Chief Justice A.M. "Sandy" Keith, Domestic Violence
and the Court System, 15 HAMLrNE L. REv. 105 (1991); Lisa Memoli & Gina Plotino, Enforce-
ment or Pretense: The Courts and the Domestic Violence Act, 15 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 39
(1993); Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases:
Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 853 (1994); Elena Salzman,
Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal Frame-
work for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REv. 329 (1994); Legal Responses to Domes-
tic Violence, supra note 3.
5 I recognize that much battering occurs in intimate relationships not sanctioned by state-
recognized marriage. The privilege does not, however, apply to unmarried couples, and a discus-
sion of battering in these relationships is beyond the scope of this Article. For further informa-
tion, see generally Mac D. Hunter, Homosexuals as a New Class of Domestic Violence Subjects
Under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,31 U. LousviuL J. FAM. L.
557 (1992-93); Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of
Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273 (1993).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 28-59 for discussion of patterns of wife abuse.
7 Michigan v. Love, 391 N.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Mich. 1986). See infra notes 165-71 and ac-
companying text.
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dence or her place of employment without permission from the court.
Several days after this order is entered, Raymond is arrested outside the
marital home. Raymond's wife now wants to drop both the domestic
violence charge and the violation of protective order charge, and wishes
to invoke her privilege not to testify.8
(c) Deneen shows up at the police station with a black eye and red
marks on her face and neck. She is wearing only a raincoat over her
pajamas. She tells the police that her husband punched her, dragged her
by the hair, and choked her. The police go with Deneen to the family
home and find her husband sitting on the steps, highly intoxicated, with
a forty-four magnum beside him. When Deneen decides not to press
domestic violence charges, the charge is reduced to disorderly conduct.
Deneen does not want to testify.9
(d) A wife calls 911 after her estranged husband breaks through the
locked back door of her condominium. He rages through the house,
screaming obscenities and threatening violence. He does not, however,
hit her. When the police arrive, they charge the husband with vandalism
and trespass. The wife wants to drop the charges and does not want to
testify.' 0
Whether the husband will be charged, tried, or convicted will depend,
in part, on the availability of evidence. Certainly the best evidence, if
not the only evidence, will come from the eyewitness spouse. But
whether these wives are considered to be witnesses competent to tes-
8 City of Reynoldsburg v. Eichenberger, No. CA-3492, 1990 WL 55402, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 18, 1990); see infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
9 City of Huron v. Bass, No. E-90-29, 1991 WL 137009, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 1991).
See infra text accompanying notes 159-61 for a discussion of this case.
10 This "hypothetical" is inspired by an incident between O.J. Simpson and Nicole Brown
Simpson that came to light after Nicole was murdered and O.J. was charged with the murder of
Nicole and her friend, Ronald Goldman. Simpson was acquitted of both charges on October 3,
1995. See California v. Orenthal James Simpson, No. BA-097211, Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Dept. No. 103, Judgments of Acquittal (Oct. 3, 1995).
Police rushed to Nicole Simpson's home October 25, 1993 after Simpson came to the house
in a rage after discovering a photo of one of her former boyfriends. Because Nicole would not
let O.J. in the house, O.J. went to the rear of the house and kicked in the French doors. Police
did not charge O.J. with vandalism and trespassing because Nicole did not want to prosecute. A
newly released police report notes that the only reason any report was made of the incident is
because the police officer insisted on taking one. Police could not refer the incident to prosecu-
tors as a spousal battery claim, said Los Angeles Police Lieutenant John Dunkin, because "you
can't charge (spouse abuse) if someone's beating up his ex-wife's car or door." California's law
against spousal battery "has to do with traumatic injuries to a person, not a thing," Dunkin said.
Sally A. Stewart, Simpson's Ex-wife Wouldn't Prosecute, USA TODAY, June 23, 1994, at 3A; see
Mark Potok, Grand Jury to Meet Today in Simpson Case, USA TODAY, June 24, 1994, at 3A.
City Attorney James Hahn and Police Chief Willie Williams met June 23, 1994 to launch a study
of police procedures on domestic violence calls and to give officers more leeway in deciding to
charge someone. "The officers [responding to the 911 call] were going by the book," said Hahn.
"But we need to rewrite the book .... Domestic abuse is more than violating a restraining order
and punching somebody. It's also harassing over the phone, slashing the tires, beating the door
down." Potok, supra, at 3A.
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tify, and whether the prosecution can compel their testimony, will de-
pend on the jurisdiction's spousal privilege.
This simple evidentiary rule-spousal privilege-illustrates why
evidence law matters." Rules of evidence are frequently thought of
as simply "neutral" rules of procedure related to courtroom control
and trial tactics. Rules of evidence can tell us much more, however,
about the legal system's attitude toward women.12 Because the legal
system was created by men, it inevitably ignores the lives of women.'3
Courts and commentators may declare loudly that domestic violence 14
is no longer tolerated in this society, and that married women have the
11 The University of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review held a symposium aptly entitled
Does Evidence Law Matter? Of particular relevance to the analysis contained in this Article is
the section entitled The Connection Between Evidence Rules, Social Values and Political Realities,
25 Loy. L.A. L REv. 629 (1992).
12 For example, the federal rules of evidence speak about character of a "victim" in Rule 404,
but talk about the "alleged victim" in the rape shield rule. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 412. (I am
indebted to Dayna Ferebee, one of my Feminist Jurisprudence students, for this observation. I
am embarrassed to say that I have been reading these rules for ten years without noticing the
difference.) The drafters of the rape shield rule seem to have fallen into the trap of believing
rape myths of the lying victim. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths
and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1013, 1045 (1991); see
also Ann Althouse, Beyond King Solomon's Harlots: Women in Evidence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1265 (1992); Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from
the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 914 (1994); Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to
Women's Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327 (1993).
13 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 238 (1989);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 2, 4 (1988). An interesting exam-
ple of this tendency to ignore the impact of rules of evidence on the lives of women is raised in
an article entitled A Right to Every Woman's Evidence In a lecture considering the spousal
privilege, the speaker invites the listener to consider what makes the study of evidence so
fascinating:
Instead of considering what I have said, consider what I have been required to draw on:
English legal history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; Bentham and Wigmore,
each a leading scholar of his generation; logical analysis as we are taught it in law schools;
attorneys' briefs and Supreme Court opinions; the sociology of prosecutorial behavior
(fraught, to be sure, with empirical inadequacy); and your responses and mine to questions
we cannot escape when values clash.
Richard 0. Lempert, Mason Ladd Lecture: A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 725, 738-39 (1981). Noticeably absent from this litany of information relied upon are the
voices and experiences of women affected by the law of marital privilege. The sociology of
prosecutors is apparently more important than the sociology of affected women. See infra text
accompanying notes 290-308 to hear battered women speak about the privilege.
14 I use the phrases "spousal violence" and "domestic violence" interchangeably in this Arti-
cle. These phrases tend to obscure the reality that wives are victims and husbands are perpetra-
tors in the vast majority of cases. See LEwis OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHs
39-40 (1986); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMAN'S MOVEMENT 214-15 (1982). A return to the term "wife-beating"
would make apparent the gendered aspects of domestic violence, but would also obscure the
reality that abuse does not always take the form of beating. Perhaps the greater problem is with
using modifiers with the word "violence." We distinguish this violence from other violence, as if
it is a lesser evil when the violence occurs at home and at the hands of intimates. Why not call it
what it is-VIOLENCE. Perhaps what is needed is to treat spousal abuse as violence unmodi-
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right to feel secure in their homes, but such rights, with little way to
prove entitlement to the rights, echo emptily. Those jurisdictions that
refuse to give the prosecution the right to compel testimony in domes-
tic violence cases the way they can in every other crime send an obvi-
ous message: When a man beats his wife it is not a crime that offends
the state-it is simply a private matter between the two of them.'5
Even those jurisdictions with a spousal violence exception leave mar-
ried women unprotected by the legal system because of very narrow
and uninformed views of what constitutes spousal violence.
Part I of this Article discusses profiles of batterers and victims as
a predicate for analyzing applications of spousal immunity. Part II
explores the common-law spousal privilege and spousal violence ex-
ceptions to the privilege. Part III explores modem applications of
spousal immunity in cases of domestic violence. Next, Part IV criti-
ques the spousal immunity doctrine from the perspective of feminist
legal thought and includes the voices of battered women discussing
the spousal privilege.16 Finally, Part V proposes a solution to the
problems caused by spousal immunity in domestic violence cases.
I. THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
"Every eighteen seconds, a woman is beaten in the United States
and between 2000 and 4000 women die every year because of this
abuse."'1 7 Some authorities estimate that incidents of domestic vio-
fled, taking inspiration from the title of Catherine A. MacKinnon's book on feminism. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
15 ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATIERING AND How TO STOP IT 27-28 (1994)
(citing Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitu-
tion Help Them When the Police Won't, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 801 (1986)); see also ELIZABETH A.
STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE 103-04 (1986) (not-
ing that police assumptions about the naturalness of violence against women pervade the sys-
tem's process of sorting out criminal from noncriminal behavior).
16 Marina Mata-de la Garza, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law student, Class of
1995, and my research assistant, conducted interviews at battered women shelters in Dallas and
Tarrant Counties, Texas. I am indebted to Marina for her hard work and sensitivity in con-
ducting these interviews. While the interviews are not meant as an accurate empirical survey,
the results give voice to women's concerns and attitudes toward the decision whether to testify. I
recognize, however, that these women, who have made the decision to leave a battering relation-
ship to go to a shelter, may be atypical. We have respected the women's desire for confidential-
ity, identifying them only by initials and revealing only the biographical data they were
comfortable with sharing. Transcripts of the interviews are on file with the author.
17 Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 237, 241
(1994) (citing Sylvia A. Law, Every 18 Seconds a Woman is Beaten: What Judges Can Do in the
Face of this Carnage, 30 JUDGES J. 12, 14 (1991)). As to women killed by a partner,
The popular tendency is to dismiss or even forgive the act as a "crime of passion." But
that rush of so-called passion is months, even years, in the making. "There are few cases
where murder comes out of the blue," says Sally Goldfarb, senior staff attorney of the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund. "What we are talking about is domestic violence left
unchecked and carried to its ultimate outcome."
Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits Home, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 18, 22.
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lence affect four million women each year.'8 The FBI estimates that
one out of every two women in this country will be in an abusive rela-
tionship at some time in her lifetime.19 The likelihood of a woman
being assaulted by a member of her family is more than two hundred
times greater than the risk of being assaulted by someone who is not a
family member.20 Intimate violence is the leading cause of injuries to
women ages fifteen through forty-four years, and one of the leading
causes of injuries to all women.21 Battering is a significant cause of
homelessness for women and children. In the last decade, almost one-
half of all homeless women were refugees from domestic violence.22
"Women are at more risk of being killed by their current or former
male partners than by any other kind of assault."23
In addition to the direct harm to women by instances of violence
in intimate relationships, researchers have identified a number of sec-
ondary harms:
[F]ederal officials estimate that "domestic violence" costs U.S. firms four
billion dollars a year in lower productivity, staff turnover, absenteeism,
and excessive use of medical benefits. One New York City study of fifty
battered women revealed that half of them missed at least three work
days a month because of abuse, while 64 percent were late for work, and
more than three-fourths of them used company time and company
phones to call friends, counselors, physicians, and lawyers that they
didn't dare call from home.24
Harm to children in homes where the husband batters the wife is also
well documented. One survey discovered that wife beaters abused
children in seventy percent of cases.25 Further, a person who exper-
iences violence as a child is more likely to engage in violence as an
18 Women and Violence: Hearings on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent
Crime Against Women Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 117
(1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.).
19 Hearing on Domestic Violence: Hearing on the Need to Concentrate the Fight Against an
Escalating Blight of Violence Against Women Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993) (statement of Sarah M. Buel).
20 Murray A. Straus, Physical Violence in American Families: Incidence Rates, Causes, and
Trends, in ABUSED AND BATIERED: SOCIAL & LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 17,18
(Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991); see also MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL, BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 49 (1980) (discussing the statistic fur-
ther); Smolowe, supra note 17, at 21.
21 Antonio R. Novello et al., From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, 267
JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992).
22 Mullins, supra note 17 at 244 (citing SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN at xiv (1991)).
23 Smolowe, supra note 17, at 21 (quoting psychol6gist Angela Browne, a pioneering re-
searcher in partner violence).
24 JONES, supra note 15, at 12.
25 Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in
FEMINIST PERSPECnVES ON WIFE ABUSE 162 (Kersti Yllo & Michelle Bograd eds., 1988).
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adult-perhaps three times as likely.26 So pervasive are the conse-
quences flowing from domestic violence that U.S. Health and Human
Services Secretary Donna Shalala has said, "Domestic violence is an
unacknowledged epidemic in our society. '27
A. The Cycle of Violence
Psychologist Lenore Walker, in her pathbreaking study of 120
battered women, identified what she terms the cycle of violence. Bat-
tering relationships go through a cycle of three stages: tension build-
ing, acute battering, and contrition. 28 During the tension building
phase, there is "minor" battering; the wife attempts to calm her
abuser by becoming "nurturing and compliant, by anticipating his
every whim, or by simply staying out of his way."'29 Nonetheless, the
abuse escalates, becoming more frequent and more serious. The level
of verbal and psychological abuse rises and he becomes more posses-
sive and jealous.30
Phase two "is characterized by the uncontrollable discharge of
the tensions that have built up during phase one."' 31 This phase of
severe battering will typically last from two to twenty-four hours.32
Everything the victim does during this phase enrages the batterer. If
she tries to defend herself, he beats her into submission; if she is pas-
sive, he beats her harder.33 The beating stops only if the batterer ex-
hausts himself or she gets away.34
The third phase-loving contrition-follows the acute battering.
The batterer begs forgiveness and promises to change, to never hit her
again.35 He brings flowers and candy; he is loving and charming.36
This romantic stage lasts until the entire cycle starts over again.37 And
it will start over: in a battering relationship, the cycle repeats, with the
abuse continually escalating.38
26 See RICHARD J. GELLES, TnE VIoLENT HOME 169-70 (1987); STRAUs, supra note 20, at
122.
27 Smolowe, supra note 17, at 20.
28 LENORE WALKER, THE BATT-ERED WOMAN 55 (1979); see also DUTrON, supra note 2, at
125.
29 WALKER, supra note 28, at 56.
30 Id. at 57-58; DUTrTON, supra note 2, at 125.
31 WALKER, supra note 28, at 59.
32 Id. at 60.
33 Id. at 61-62.
34 Id. at 61.
35 Id. at 65.
36 Id. at 65-66.
37 Id. at 69.
38 Id. at 69 ("Most women report that before they know it, the calm, loving behavior gives
way to little battering incidents again. The phase-one tension building recurs, a new cycle of
battering behavior begins.")
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B. Profile of a Batterer
Because the initial focus of the battered women's movement was
the victim, information about batterers is less extensive than that
available about the victims of domestic violence. With the growth of
treatment programs for batterers, however, researchers and counsel-
ors have been able to construct more accurate portraits of batterers.39
One common variable appearing in literature about batterers is power
motivation.40
Donald Dutton reported that batterers in treatment groups mani-
fested power issues through frequent mention of "their need to con-
trol or dominate the female, their belief that female independence
meant loss of male control, and their attempt to persuade or coerce
the female into adopting their definition of how the relationship
should be structured and how it should function."'41 Controlling be-
haviors by the batterer include threatening his wife if she talks about
leaving, tearing the telephone off the wall to prevent her from calling
the police, spying on her house, and lying in wait to assault her new
boyfriend.42
The typical batterer is a traditionalist, believing in male
supremacy, the stereotyped masculine sex role in the family,4 3 and his
entitlement to use violence to discipline his wife.44 His assumption
that male entitlement has priority over female needs allows him to
deny the wrongness of the violence.45 In working with batterers,
James Ptacek detected a pattern of batterer justification for violence
because of the wife's failure to fulfill the "obligations of a good
wife."' 46 Ptacek saw in the batterers' explanations a deeply gendered
sense that the privileges of male entitlement had been unjustly de-
nied.47 One batterer described how his "arguments" with his wife
would start:
39 Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the
Problem, Forging the Solution, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 286 (1985). Waits notes that early infor-
mation about batterers came from victims' reports because of the reluctance of the perpetrators
to talk about violence and their tendency to deny and minimize their violence. Id. at 240 n.95.
Waits notes further that the accuracy of the victims' reports have been confirmed by the new
information coming to light from the batterers themselves. Id.
40 DuTrON, supra note 2, at 64.
41 Id.
42 James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECrIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE, supra note 25, at 151.
43 WALKER, supra note 28, at 36.
44 Id. at 12; Ptacek, supra note 42, at 133.
45 Ptacek, supra note 42, at 149.
46 Id. at 147.
47 Seventy-eight percent of the batterers Ptacek interviewed gave justifications that fall into
this category. Id.
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I think a lot of it had to do with my frustration of not being able to
handle children.... [My wife] would tell me, you know, "Let me handle
this." I said, "I'm the man of the house." Then we'd start arguing.
That's basically how they used to happen.48
Ptacek noted other gendered excuses from batterers: "I should just
smack you for the lousy wife you've been"; "I don't know if I de-
manded respect as a person or a husband or anything like that, but
... "; "I'm the man of the house"; and "the first time I was acting like a
man and I got it.' '4 9 The batterer's feelings of entitlement may be a
learned response: many batterers saw their fathers beat their mothers
or were beaten themselves, or both.50 Lenore Walker reports that
even in batterers' childhood homes where overt violence was absent, a
general lack of respect for women and children was evident.5 1
Another staple characteristic of the batterer is possessiveness and
jealousy.52 In order to feel secure he must constantly monitor his
wife's every activity, but he remains suspicious of her possible rela-
tionships with other men. A frequent subject of his verbal abuse is
suspicion that his wife is having an affair or affairs.53 Consider the
following situation:
Robert was referred to our treatment group while his wife was still hos-
pitalized for injuries sustained from his beating.... The incident that led
to his being in the group occurred at his wife's office party. About thirty
people were drinking and chatting when, according to Robert, his wife
disappeared (i.e., he could not find her in a large, unfamiliar house). Af-
ter ten to fifteen minutes he saw her and insisted that they leave the
party.... During treatment, Robert revealed that he believed his wife
was having an affair and that, when she disappeared at the party, she was
having sex with a co-worker. (She was talking to two female co-workers
on an outside balcony.) Two months into treatment Robert phoned me
in a panic and said that he was "about to kill [his] wife." He had re-
turned from an out-of-town business trip to find "a key with a man's
name on it." (It was the name of the key manufacturer.) He again as-
sumed his wife was having an affair and became enraged. It took him
three days to completely calm down.54
The batterer's jealousy also leads him to drive away his wife's relatives
and female friends; his pathological jealousy extends to the couple's
48 ld. (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 148.
50 WALKER, supra note 28, at 38.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 37.
53 Id. at 37-38.
54 Du-ro', supra note 2, at 30. This is a case study of a man who underwent treatment in
the Assaultive Husbands Program, a court-mandated treatment program in Vancouver, B.C.
The author notes that "[n]ames and certain aspects of the men's lives have been changed to
protect their identity." Id. at 29.
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own children as well.5 5 It is by isolating his wife from others that he is
able most effectively to control her.
Ptacek concludes that the batterer deliberately chooses to use vi-
olence to control his wife.56 However, Ptacek found that the decision
to use violence was often obscured by the batterer's excuse that he
was out of control. Ptacek discerned that "[w]hile the men claim that
their violence is beyond rational control, they simultaneously ac-
knowledge that the violence is deliberate and warranted. 57 Further
evidence of the control the batterer has over his use of violence is the
fact that he is rarely violent in other relationships, 58 and that he rarely
batters his wife when there are witnesses (other than the children).59
C. Profile of a Battered Wife
The first question leveled at a battered woman tends to be, "why
do you stay?" 60
Why would anyone subject herself to repeated, severe beatings? Why
would anyone remain in a relationship that carries an ever-present
threat of injury and even death? And why, as so often happens, would a
battered woman repeatedly leave her husband, only to return again and
again to face inevitable beatings? 61
Kathleen Waits concludes that the explanation lies not in psychopa-
thology, but in a "tragic combination of social and personal forces."62
Lenore Walker, who pioneered the study of battered women,
identifies a number of characteristics common to battered women.63
The battered woman is a traditionalist, viewing her husband as the
head of the family and believing, even if she works outside the home,
that "a woman's proper place is in the home."64 She feels responsible
for maintaining the peace at home, and thus accepts the blame for her
husband's violence.65 For example:
55 WALKER, supra note 28, at 37-38. The well-documented fact that battering frequently
occurs during pregnancy, RicHARD J. GELLEs, Violence and Pregnancy: A Note on the Extent of
the Problem and Needed Services, in GELLEs, FAMILY VioLENCE 126-27 (1987), may be ex-
plained by the jealousy Walker noted.
56 Ptacek, supra note 42, at 147-49.
57 Id. at 153.
58 Lenore Walker found that no more than 20% of batterers are violent toward others.
WALKER, supra note 28, at 24; see also Ptacek, supra note 42, at 143 (noting that his study of
batterers found that only 28% were violent both within and outside of the family.).
59 WALKER, supra note 28, at 61. Walker opines, "It seems reasonable to conclude that the
men know their behavior is inappropriate, because they keep battering such a private affair." Id.
60 Waits, supra note 39, at 279.
61 Id. at 279-80.
62 Id. at 280.
63 WALKER, supra note 28, at 31.
64 Id at 33-34. According to Walker, battered women who work outside the home often feel
guilty about their work.
65 id at 34.
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Q: How did you react the first time you were hit?
A: I blamed myself and said if I would have shut up or if I would have
not done this, or if I had done this, this would not have happened. In
any instance, I always felt responsible for the situation, and that I should
do something to fix it. I always had to be the one to "make up" follow-
ing being hit, like it was my fault and I should apologize.66
Battered women stay, they say, because they love their husbands.
One woman who had left her husband to go to a shelter said:
[A]fter all I have been through in the relationship I am currently in, I
still want to be in it. I don't want to lose that person, even though I
know in my head I deserve better. You can always know in my (sic)
head, but it's making your heart follow through that's hard. 67
For battered women, the beatings engender "learned helplessness," 6 8
serious impairment of problem-solving abilities,69 and clinical depres-
sion that makes it difficult to deal with even simple, everyday mat-
ters.70 Low self-esteem is also common among battered women.7 1
The battered woman believes her husband when he tells her that he
beat her because she is stupid and ugly.72 She minimizes the serious-
ness of the battering because her identity becomes submerged in his:
It is very easy, when you care about someone, more than you care about
yourself, to not want to punish them .... You want to be with that
person so much that you become willing to accept any type of behavior,
or lifestyle, just so that you are with them, especially if your self-esteem
revolves around being with that person.73
66 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995).
67 Id. D.W. explained that her husband would kick, slap, and shove her. She had to go to
the hospital to get stitches over one eye after one incident, and for treatment of a hairline frac-
ture in her arm after another.
68 The theory of learned helplessness was developed first in experiments on animals. When
subjected to electric shocks at random, animals, realizing that they could not control the punish-
ment, become passive and compliant. WALKER, supra note 28, at 45-48.
69 Id. at 48; Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Public-Health Conceptions of Family Abuse, in ABUSED
AND BATrERED, supra note 20, at 43.
70 WALKER, supra note 28, at 50; see CHARLEs EwiNo, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KIL 21
(1987).
71 WALKER, supra note 28, at 32. Walker notes that often low self-esteem exists prior to the
marriage and the beatings:
Women are systematically taught that their personal worth, survival, and autonomy do not
depend on effective and creative responses to life situations, but rather on their physical
beauty and appeal to men. They learn that they have no direct control over the circum-
stances of their lives. Early in their lives, little girls learn from their parents and society that
they are to be more passive than boys. Having systematically trained to be second best,
women begin marriage with a psychological disadvantage.
Id. at 51.
72 ELAINE BASAM ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE: THE BATTERED WOMAN 11 (1984).
73 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995).
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She comes to hate herself for being unable to leave: "Thus, a destruc-
tive psychological spiral is established: . ..her inability to escape
makes her feel even more inadequate and helpless." 74
The situation is exacerbated when the battered wife is financially
dependent on the batterer.75 The presence of children may also ham-
per her ability to leave. Many battered women express the belief that
children need their fathers or say that they are staying in the relation-
ship because of the children.76
Getting hit Will go away, it'll stop for a while. But packing up the chil-
dren? Where do you go? A shelter? But what happens after you stay a
while at the shelter? You can't stay there forever. Will it be worse be-
cause you left in the first place? You feel responsible and ask "What if I
hadn't opened my mouth?" You know, you have no car and no job,
what do you do?77
Other women find the strength to leave because of the children: "I
was scared of him. I wanted to leave for the children. I sometimes
had to throw them out the window so that he would not come after
them."78
In trying to understand why women stay in battering relation-
ships, some have drawn analogies between battered women and
hostages:
An American male hostage in the 1985 TWA skyjacking was overheard
saying at the end of the crisis, "I will be coming back to Lebanon.
Hamiye [one of the jailers] is like a brother to me." Why did Birgitta
Lundblad, the Swedish bank teller, who had been held hostage for six
days, visit one of her captors while he was in jail following the bank
holdup? Why do many battered women "love" the men who batter
them, finding it difficult to leave them?79
Donald Dutton has developed a theory of "traumatic bonding" to ex-
plain the beaten wife's reluctance to leave. Traumatic bonding refers
to the strong emotional ties that develop in a relationship character-
ized by a power imbalance and intermittent abuse.80 Further, the re-
74 Waits, supra note 39, at 283.
75 See WALKER, supra note 28, at 33-34. Walker found that even women who work outside
the home and thus have an income typically turn their money over to their husbands. They may
also be forced to quit work to keep their batterers happy. In explaining why it took so long to
leave the batterer, many women explain that he controlled the finances. See, eg., Interview with
M.D., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995) ("I was insecure of not making it financially."); Interview
with R.E.H., supra note 16 (Mar. 28, 1995) ("I didn't have a family to turn to. I had no
money.").
76 WALKER, supra note 28, at 30; see also Interview with A.A., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995)
("I would stay for the children, but they would tell me to leave him."). A.A. has four children
ranging in age from twelve to two.
77 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995).
78 Interview with J.S., supra note 16 (Mar. 28, 1995). J.S. has five children.
79 Dee L.R. Graham et al., Survivors of Terror: Battered Women, Hostages, and the Stock-
holm Syndrome, in FEMINISr PERSPECrIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 25, at 217.
80 DtrON, supra note 2, at 191-92; see also Graham et al., supra note 79, at 217-21.
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inforcement from the contrition phase 81-ove, attention, romance-
makes it difficult to leave.82
II. SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
A. The Right to Compel Testimony Generally
"The power of government to compel persons to testify ... is
firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence. ' 83 English law
provided that courts had the power as early as 1562.84 By 1742 it was
considered an "indubitable certainty" that "the public has a right to
every man's evidence."85 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion refers to the right to compulsory process,8 6 and the Judiciary Act
of 1789 provided for compulsory process for witnesses in federal
court.8 7 Every state in the Union makes provision for compulsory
process, recognizing the power of the state government to compel the
testimony of witnesses.88
The duty to testify arises from the need of the judicial system to
have access to all relevant evidence to aid in ascertaining the truth.89
The need for the testimony allows the government to compel testi-
mony even when the duty to testify requires sacrifices from a citizen.90
As Wigmore aptly noted, "[f]rom the point of view of society's right to
our testimony, it is to be remembered that the demand comes, not
from any one person or set of persons, but from the community as a
whole-from justice as an institution and from law and order as indis-
pensable elements of civilized life."9' There are, however, exceptions
to the power to compel testimony. The Fifth Amendment privilege
81 See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
82 WALKER, supra note 28, at 66-69.
83 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (citing 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2190 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
84 Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. 1, cl. 9, § 12 (1562).
85 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443 n.5 (quoting the remarks of the Duke of Argyle and Lord Chan-
cellor Hardwicke, reported in 12 T. HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 675, 693
(1812), and referring to the parliamentary debate on the Bill to Indemnify Evidence).
86 The Court in Kastigar noted that the duty to testify was recognized in the Sixth Amend-
ment's requirement that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him as well as the
requirement that an accused have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 406
U.S. at 443-44.
87 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 88-89.
88 See, e.g., Ex parte Weeks, 456 So. 2d 404, 407-08 (Ala. 1984); People v. Schweitzer, 187
Cal. Rptr. 696, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 555, 556-57 (Ga. 1989);
Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236, 247 (Iowa 1983); State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W.2d 744, 746
(Wis. 1982).
89 Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 242.
90 Id.
91 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 72-73 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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against compulsory self-incrimination is perhaps the most familiar.92
Other privileges, including the spousal privilege, are exceptions as
well.
B. Separating the Two Marital Privileges
Two marital privileges exist,93 and some confusion ensues because
the term "marital privilege" is sometimes used to refer to both. One
privilege prevents the testimony of one spouse against the other
(spousal immunity),94 while the other prevents testimony only about
confidential communications made during marriage (marital commu-
nications privilege). 95
Spousal immunity, in most jurisdictions, applies only in criminal
cases.96 The privilege arises upon the marriage of the witness spouse
and the defendant spouse and terminates upon their divorce.97
Spousal immunity works as a complete bar to testimony, regardless of
the subject matter of the testimony. In some jurisdictions, spousal im-
munity is read broadly enough to lead to exclusion of otherwise ad-
92 The Court in Kastigar calls it the most important. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
444(1972).
93 Others have subdivided the same protections into three or four different privileges. See
WRIGHr & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDuR : EVIDENCE § 5572 (1989) (three
marital privileges); Rejected Fed. R. Evid. 504 advisory commitee's note (four different marital
privileges); Comment, Evidentiary Privileges and Incompetencies of Husband and Wife, 4 ARK.
L. REv. 426 (1950) (four marital privileges); Note, Adverse Spousal Testimony in Federal Courts,
33 TuL L. REv. 884 (1959) (three spousal privileges).
94 A number of other terms are frequently used to refer to this privilege. Wigmore dubbed it
"the privilege for anti-marital facts." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 91, ch. 79, at 210. Some commen-
tators refer to it as the adverse testimony privilege as distinguished from the communications
privilege. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1563
(1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. I use the term "spousal immunity," as does
Richard Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, supra note 13, at 726, in recognition of
the origin of the privilege as a rule of incompetency preventing a spouse from testifying.
95 Discussion of the communications privilege is beyond the scope of this Article. Communi-
cations privileges tend to provide less difficulty in spousal abuse cases than does the spousal
immunity privilege because courts tend to hold that threats and violence are not communicative,
or are not induced by the confidence incident to marriage, and thus do not come within the
privilege. See ag., Morgan v. United States, 363 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. 1976); Harris v. State, 376
A.2d 1144,1146 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); People v. Thompson, 314 N.W.2d 606,610 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981); State v. Johnson, 586 S.W.2d 437,441 & n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Americk,
256 P.2d 278, 279 (Wash. 1953). Some jurisdictions have a spousal violence exception to their
confidential communications privilege as well as to their spousal immunity privilege, thus al-
lowing the wife's testimony about the abuse. See, ag., 725 ILL COMp. STAT. ANN. § 125/6
(Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. CODE EVID. AN. art. 504 (West 1995).
96 See David Medine, The Adverse Testimonial Privilege' Time to Dispose of a 'Sentimental
Relic', 67 OR. L. REV. 519, 520 & n.8 (1988).
97 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66, at 162 (3d ed. 1984); WRIGHT & GRA-
HAM, supra note 93, § 5572.
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missible out-of-court statements made by a spouse who declines to
testify.98
The marital communications privilege protects against disclosure
of confidential communications made during marriage. The marital
status of the spouses at the time of the trial is immaterial; so long as
the communication was made during marriage, the privilege applies.99
When a spouse, currently married to the defendant spouse, is
called to testify about confidential communications made between the
spouses during marriage, both privileges would apply and either could
be invoked to prevent the testimony.100 In a number of situations,
however, there is no overlap of the two privileges. For example, if a
divorced spouse is called to testify, spousal immunity would not apply,
but the testifying spouse could not testify about confidential commu-
nications made during marriage.' 0 ' If a communication between the
spouses occurred in the presence of a third person, thus destroying
confidentiality and rendering the communications privilege inapplica-
ble, 02 a spouse called to testify could still refuse to testify by invoking
spousal immunity. If the testifying spouse chooses, as the holder of
the privilege, 0 3 to waive the immunity privilege, but the defendant
spouse, as the holder of the communications privilege' 04 refuses to
waive it, the testifying spouse may testify but may not reveal any con-
fidential communications made during marriage.
98 Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 943-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1963);
Estes v. Kentucky, 744 S.W.2d 421,423-25 (Ky. 1988); Dawson v. Kentucky, 867 S.W.2d 493,495
(Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (extrajudicial statement admissible because spousal violence exception to
privilege applied); Bayse v. Mississippi, 420 So. 2d 1050, 1053-54 (Miss. 1982) (wife's out-of-court
statements to police inadmissible on both spousal privilege and hearsay grounds). But see State
v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 759-61 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (spousal immunity excludes only in-
court testimony of spouse). Wigmore stated that it could be argued that the privilege extends to
"testimonial utterance[s] in any form" and therefore hearsay statements "are equally privileged
with testimony on the stand." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 2232, at 225-26. An early draft of
the Proposed Federal Rules provided that the privilege applied to hearsay as well as live testi-
mony. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 93, § 5571, at n.7. This provision was later changed
and was not transmitted to Congress with this hearsay limitation. Id. at n.18.
99 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.33, at 473 (1995); Id.
§ 5.34, at 478.
100 "The testimonial privilege [spousal immunity] is the broader of the two in that it precludes
all adverse testimony by the spouse, not merely disclosure of confidential communications." Id.
§ 5.33, at 473.
101 See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); United Stites v. Fisher, 518 F.2d
836, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 99, § 5.33, at 473.
102 See, e.g., Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14, 16 (1934); United States v. Crouthers, 669
F.2d 635, 642 (10th Cir. 1982).
103 See infra text accompanying notes 126-33.
104 The holder of the communications privilege is generally the communicant spouse-the
spouse who made the statement. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 93, §§ 5586-5587.
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C. Overview of the Origin and History of Spousal Immunity
1. The Privilege Itself-Two commentators have noted that the
overwhelming majority of articles written on the marital privilege, un-
like those written on other evidentiary principles, have some account
of history in them. 0 5 While it is tempting to buck that trend, the same
commentators correctly state that history plays an important part in
understanding the marital privilege. 0 6 Only in investigating the ori-
gins and history of the marital privilege is it possible to understand
why and how the rules work to disadvantage married women.
Writing in 1628, Lord Coke observed that "it hath beene resolved
by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her
husband.' u0 7 As the United States Supreme Court has noted:
This spousal disqualification sprang from two canons of medieval juris-
prudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in
his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; [and] second,
the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the woman
had no recognized separate legal existence the husband was that one.
From those two now long-abandoned doctrines, it followed that what
was inadmissible from the lips of the defendant-husband was also inad-
missible from his wife.108
Thus, the spousal immunity privilege arose from the rule rendering
interested witnesses incompetent. 0 9 Although statutes in the United
States and England eventually made interested parties competent to
testify, "the rule of spousal disqualification remained intact in most
common-law jurisdictions well into the 19th century."" 0 When the
U.S. Supreme Court applied the privilege in 1920, it was deemed so
well established a proposition as to "hardly requir[e] mention.""'
Holding true to its origin as a witness incompetency rule, the
spousal disqualification extended to all testimony, whether for or
against the criminal defendant. In 1933, the Supreme Court partially
abolished the spousal disqualification in the federal courts, so as to
permit the spouse of a defendant to testify for the defendant.112 The
Court noted that the practice of disqualifying witnesses with a per-
105 Id. § 5572, at n.20.
106 Id.
107 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LrrrLETON 6b (1628). See generally 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 91, § 2227 (discussing Coke's role in the creation or promulgation of the privilege).
108 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
109 Wigmore suggests a slightly different history of the privilege. He believed that the spousal
privilege arose before the spousal incompetency rule, but was "quickly submerged beneath a
rule of spousal incompetence that was originated or popularized by Lord Coke." Wmnrr &
GRAHAM, supra note 93, § 5572 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 2227).
110 Trammell, 445 U.S. at 44; see also 8 WVIMoRE, supra note 91, § 2333; Note, The Husband-
Wife Testimonial Privilege in Federal Courts, 59 B.U. L. REv. 894, 895 (1979).
111 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920); see also Graves v. United States,
150 U.S. 118, 120-21 (1893); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 220-23 (1839).
112 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1933).
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sonal interest in the outcome of the case had long since been abol-
ished in this country in accordance with a modem trend that
permitted interested witnesses to testify and left it for the jury to as-
sess their credibility.1 3 Since defendants were uniformly allowed to
testify in their own behalf, no reason remained to prevent them from
using their spouses as witnesses. The Court, however, left undisturbed
the rule that the defendant spouse could prevent the other from giving
adverse testimony." 4
The American Law Institute, in its 1942 Model Code of Evidence,
rejected a rule allowing the criminal defendant to exclude all adverse
spousal testimony.115 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1953, also rejected the rule, "still existing in some states, and largely a
sentimental relic, of not requiring one spouse to testify against the
other in a criminal action. 11 6 Several state legislatures enacted simi-
lar provisions.117
The Supreme Court considered the continued vitality of the privi-
lege against adverse spousal testimony in the federal courts in 1958 in
Hawkins v. United States.118 The Government did not seek abolition
of the rule so that reluctant spouses could be compelled to testify, but
rather sought a modification of the rule so as to allow a spouse to
testify voluntarily against the defendant spouse. 119 Asserting that the
purpose of the rule was to preserve marital harmony, and that much
bitterness would be engendered by voluntary testimony against the
defendant spouse, the Court chose not to abandon its rule against ad-
verse spousal testimony.120
In 1973, the Supreme Court transmitted to Congress proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence. Although Congress ultimately rejected all
of the proposed rules concerning privileges, Proposed Federal Rule
505 provides an interesting snapshot of the prevailing sentiment on
the Court with regard to spousal immunity. The proposed rule pro-
vided in part as follows:
(a) General rule of privilege. An accused in a criminal proceeding has a
privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying against him.
113 Id. at 377-78.
114 Id. at 373.
115 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 215 (1942).
116 See UNIF. R. EVrD. 23(2) commentary (1953).
117 See Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where
the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modem Trend, 38 VA. L. REv.
359, 362-66 (1952). See infra notes 153.55 and accompanying text for a discussion of states that
currently have no spousal immunity privilege.
118 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
119 Id. at 77.
120 Id.
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(b) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
accused or by the spouse on his behalf.121
The Advisory Committee noted that this rule, making the defendant
spouse the holder of the privilege, was consistent with the law in at
least thirty jurisdictions and with the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the issue, Hawkins v. United States.122 As previ-
ously noted, Congress rejected the proposed rule and adopted instead
a single rule stating that the privilege of a witness "shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."'u 3
Thus, in federal court, the existence and scope of the spousal immu-
nity privilege was once again left to the courts.
Seven years later, in 1980, the Supreme Court in Trammel v.
United States'2 4 held that "reason and experience" no longer justified
the Hawkins rule. Although spousal immunity was left intact so that a
reluctant spouse could resist prosecution attempts to compel testi-
mony, the Court held that a witness-spouse, as the holder of the privi-
lege, could choose to waive the privilege and voluntarily testify against
the defendant spouse.125
A number of jurisdictions have rules like Trammel, in which the
witness-spouse is the holder of the privilege and thus can resist state
compulsion, but can testify voluntarily for the state.126 Other jurisdic-
tions make the defendant-spouse the holder of the privilege, 127 while
still others require the consent of both spouses before one can tes-
tify.128 In most American jurisdictions the spousal immunity doctrine
121 FED. R. Evro. 505 (Proposed Official Draft 1972).
122 Id. at advisory committee's notes.
123 FED. R. EvID. 501.
124 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
125 Id.
126 ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (1995); ALAsKA R. EvrD. 505; CAL EvmI. CODE § 970 (West
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ArNN. § 54-84a (West 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (1995); GA.
CODE At. § 24-9-23 (Supp. 1994); HAW. R. EvID. 505; LA. R. EVID. 505; MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PRoc. § 9-106 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 546.260 (Vernon Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (West 1994); OR. REv.
STAT. § 40.255 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-17-10 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6 (1995); see,
e.g., Ziglar v. Alabama, 629 So. 2d 43, 46 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (witness-wife was holder of
privilege and court erred in compelling her testimony after she invoked the privilege).
127 Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107
(West Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1990); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2162 (West
Supp. 1995); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 595-02 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-16-212 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1995); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (Supp. 1995); see, e.g., Arizona v. Cohen,
844 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Ariz. 1992) (defendant-husband, as holder of the privilege, could prevent
his wife's testimony).
128 See, eg., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1989) ("During the existence of the marriage, a hus-
band and wife can in no criminal case be a witness against the other. This privilege may be
waived only with the consent of both spouses.").
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has shed its roots as a rule of incompetency and is considered a true
privilege, waivable by the holder. 129 Some jurisdictions still maintain
that spousal immunity is a rule of incompetency which can be raised
by either party or sua sponte by the court.130 Thus, in Ohio v. Sav-
age,'31 the court held that, as a rule of incompetency, spousal immu-
nity could not be waived by the husband's failure to object to his
wife's testimony at a preliminary hearing.132 Further, the wife's testi-
mony at that hearing was not admissible under the hearsay exception
for prior testimony of unavailable witnesses. The court noted that,
while unavailability under the hearsay rule meant a person "exempted
... on the ground of privilege," the wife was not unavailable, but was
instead incompetent. 133
2. The Privilege in Cases of Spousal Violence.-The common-
law spousal immunity privilege developed a number of exceptions
over its long history. "[T]he oldest and the most frequently litigated
exception"'134 is applicable in cases when one spouse has committed a
crime of violence against the other spouse. In such a case, the privi-
lege does not apply. The exception was recognized at least as early as
the 1631 prosecution of the notorious Lord Audley who willingly sub-
jected his wife to gang rape by his friends.135 The Supreme Court
noted in 1839 that spousal immunity does not apply "where the hus-
band commits an offence against the person of his wife."'136 Often
rationalized as a "necessity" exception, it was developed in response
to the difficulty of prosecuting a spouse who committed a crime of
violence against the other spouse, when there were usually no other
witnesses to the crime.137 Other courts and commentators rational-
ized the exception by referencing one stated purpose of the privilege:
to preserve marital harmony. Thus, Wigmore argued, there would be
129 Cf. Young v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 331,333 (Ct. App. 1961) (holding that, because
the term "competency" in the statute means "privilege," husband shot by wife comes within the
exception, and the privilege does not exist).
130 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1988);
see also Privileged Communications, supra note 94, at 1567; Deborah A. Ausburn, Note, Circling
the Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family Testimonial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REv. 173, 181
n.26 (1985).
131 506 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ohio 1987).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 198-99.
134 WRiGT-rr & GRAHAM, supra note 93, § 5592.
135 Lord Audley's Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1141 (1631); see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 91,
§ 2239.
136 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209,220 (1839). Although Stein v. Bowman was a civil
action involving testimony of a wife about conversations she had with her husband, the Court in
Hawkins noted that the Stein Court was clearly concerned with the broader question involved in
Hawkins-whether the wife could testify against the husband in a criminal case "merely because
[she] so desired." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 & n.3 (1958).
137 WRIMH-r & GRAHAM, supra note 93, § 5592.
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little marital harmony to be preserved after one spouse had battered
the other.138
The early common-law interpretations of the spousal violence ex-
ception by state courts tended to be extremely narrow. While assaults
and attempted murders were invariably considered within the excep-
tion,139 what constituted assaultive behavior could be considered very
strictly. In Grier v. Georgia,140 the criminal defendant shot at his wife
while she was holding her infant child. He missed his wife, but twice
struck the baby, killing her. The court held that there was no avail-
able exception to the spousal privilege because no offense was com-
mitted upon the person of the wife. Thus, the wife remained an
incompetent witness. 141 In a case in which the husband cursed his
wife, verbally abused her, and jerked her up and down, injuring her
arm in the process, the court held that the spousal violence exception
was unavailable because the husband was not charged with assault but
with disturbing the peace. 142
Rape of the wife' 43 was usually considered within the common-
law spousal violence exception allowing her testimony.'" However, a
hypertechnical reading of the exception allowed one court to hold that
the wife was not competent, for the charged rape occurred before the
defendant and the victim married.145 The exception for injury to a
spouse did not apply since she was not a spouse when the injury oc-
curred. But because the witness was married to the defendant at the
time of trial, she was incompetent to testify in the criminal trial against
him.
A number of American states adopted the "spousal violence" ex-
ception to the privilege through adoption of English common law.
Others adopted it by statute. In a small number of jurisdictions, the
138 8 WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 2239.
139 Kentucky v. Sapp, 14 S.W. 834 (Ky. 1890) (noting that in an attempted poisoning case,
wife could testify that she saw her husband sprinkle a substance-later identified as arsenic-on
her food); Louisiana v. Parker, 8 So. 473,474 (La. 1890) (shooting with intent to murder); Michi-
gan v. Sebring, 33 N.W. 808 (Mich. 1887) (assault and battery).
140 123 S.E. 210 (Ga. 1924).
141 The court stated, "It must be remembered that the wife is not permitted to testify at all
except as a matter of exception to the general rule; and the provision for her testifying, being an
exception, cannot be liberally extended, and must be strictly construed." Id. at 214. As of 1987,
Georgia provides an exception when either spouse is charged with a crime against the person of
a minor child. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-23 (Supp. 1994). Today, Mrs. Grier would not only have
been competent, but compellable to testify against her husband.
142 Missouri v. Vaughan, 118 S.W. 1186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909).
143 This occurs usually through an accomplice liability theory, since a husband could not be
charged with rape of his own wife in most jurisdictions. See Robin L. West, Equality Theory,
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45 (1990).
144 North Carolina v. Martin, 194 S.E.2d 60, 61-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973); Kitchen v. Texas, 276
S.W. 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).
145 Missouri v. Evans, 39 S.W. 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1897).
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original common-law exception applied until statutory enactment
eliminated the exception. In Alabama, for example, the supreme
court adopted the common-law rule in 1892;146 however, in 1915, the
Alabama legislature enacted a statute reversing the common-law
rule.147 The new statute created an election for the witness spouse.
Thus, an abused wife could choose to testify voluntarily against her
husband (even over his objection), but she could not be compelled to
testify. 148 The apparent rationale for doing away with the common-
law rule was that it was no longer needed once the wife had the right
to testify voluntarily. Surely a battered spouse would want to testify!
And if she did not, then one must assume that marital harmony ex-
isted and should be preserved. 149
These views of the privilege exhibit an almost deliberate igno-
rance of the nature and consequences of domestic violence. The
courts that narrowly interpret the "crime against the person of the
spouse" exception fail to recognize the significance of conduct true to
common patterns of battering relationships. The courts that are satis-
fied with leaving the decision in the hands of the victim are oblivious
to the well-documented behavior of victims of spousal violence.
While these courts may be forgiven-in 1890 or 1930-for applying
the common-law doctrine in a manner consistent with the mores of
their times, modem courts are still applying these archaic notions
about spousal violence despite the availability of information leading
to contrary views.
III. MODERN APPLICATIONS OF THE SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
DOCTRINE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
Wright and Graham have culled more than fifteen exceptions to
the spousal immunity privilege, including the exception for crimes
against a spouse.150 They suggest that the spousal crime exception has
been interpreted broadly, and usually without regard to the underly-
ing rationales for the exception: "As sometimes happens with excep-
tions, over the next several centuries this one was expanded by
legislative and judicial action far beyond the bounds of physical vio-
146 Johnson v. Alabama, 10 So. 427 (Ala. 1892). The court followed the rule laid down in the
American & English Encyclopedia of Law: "in any criminal proceeding against the husband or
wife, for any bodily injury or violence inflicted upon his or her wife or husband, such wife or
husband is competent and compellable to testify." 7 AM. & ENG. ENCYCLOPEDIA L. 102 (1889).
147 1915 Ala. Acts 942, § 1.
148 DeBardeleben v. Alabama, 77 So. 979 (Ala. 1918). Georgia followed a similar pattern.
See Georgia v. Peters, 444 S.E.2d 609, 611-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the history of
spousal immunity in Georgia).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 60-82 for a discussion on why battered wives are reluc-
tant to testify.
150 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 93, § 5591.
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lence."' 51 They note, however, that the expansion has been inconsis-
tent, leading one jurisdiction to apply the exception when the husband
abandoned his wife, but not when he came home drunk and disturbed
the peace.152 Expansion of the exception has generally not resulted
from a recognition of the patterns of spousal abuse nor from an un-
derstanding of battered women.
A. States with No Spousal Immunity
A number of states have no spousal immunity statute.153 In most
of these states the common-law doctrine of incompetency of spouses
to be witnesses was in force until adoption of a confidential communi-
cations privilege. After the communications privilege was in place,
the prevailing notion became that protecting confidentiality of com-
munications was sufficient, and the common-law doctrine was
abrogated.
In a state with no doctrine of spousal immunity, a spouse is a
competent and compellable witness in all criminal proceedings. The
only remaining question becomes to what extent the spouse can reveal
confidential communications on the witness stand. A number of
states have included a statutory spousal violence exception to the con-
fidential communications privilege,154 or created one by judicial
action.' 55
151 Id § 5592, at 738-39.
152 Id. § 5592, at 738 (citing Charles B. Erickson, Comment, Testimony by Husband and Wife
in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REV. 546, 549 (1959)).
153 Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Wisconsin do not have a spousal immunity privilege. They do, however, preserve the spousal
communications privilege. See ARK. R. EvlD. 501, 504; DEL. R. Evl. 504; FLA. STAT. AtN.
§ 90.504 (West 1994); id. § 914.07 (West 1994); IrD. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1994); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-407, 60-423 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (West 1980), ME. R.
EvlD. 504; N.H. R. EVID. 504; N.M. R. EvlD. 11-501, 11-505; N.Y. CiV. PRAc. L & R. 4502,4512
(McKinney 1992); N.Y. CmiM. PROC. LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1992); N.D. R. EvrD. 501, 504;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 33 2501,2504 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994);
S.D. CODinED LAWs ANN. § 19-13-12 to -15 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-104 (1990); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1973); VT. R. EvrD. 504; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 1993).
154 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., Iowa v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1986). Iowa had a spousal immunity
statute that had a spousal violence exception. IowA CODE § 622.7 (1983) (repealed by 1983
Iowa Acts ch. 37, § 7). The confidential communications statute contained no spousal violence
exception. IOVA CODE § 622.9 (1983). Noting that a literal interpretation of the communica-
tions privilege would in many cases forbid an inquiry into the personal wrongs committed by one
spouse against the other, the court created a spousal violence exception. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d at
676; see also People v. McCormack, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139, 145 (App. Div. 1951); Washington v.
Moxley, 491 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
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B. States with Spousal Violence Exceptions
A majority of states recognize an exception to spousal immunity
when one spouse perpetrates violence upon the other.156 Thus, in
Maryland, there is an exception when one spouse commits "assault
and battery" against the other,157 and in Connecticut, the exception
applies when a spouse "received personal violence from the other.' 158
In other jurisdictions, the language is a bit more ambiguous. For ex-
ample, Ohio's spousal immunity statute reads as follows:
Every person is competent to be a witness except:
(A) ....
(B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with crimes
except crimes against the testifying spouse or the children of either.159
Such a statute appears broad enough to deal with any number of
crimes in which the spouse is victimized. Consider, however, City of
Huron v. Bass.160 Deneen Bass went to the Huron Police Department
to file a domestic violence report against her husband. She had a
black eye and her face and neck were covered with red areas. Deneen
was crying when she appeared at the station, wearing her coat over
her pajamas. She told a police officer that her husband had been
drinking all day and that when he returned home he accused her of
having extra-marital affairs. He then punched her in the eye, dragged
156 See ALASKA R. EVID. 505(a)(2)(D)(i); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (Supp. 1995);
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 972, 985 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West Supp.
1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 1994); HAW. R. EVID. 505; IDAHO CODE § 9-203
(1990); IDAHO R. EVID. 504; 725 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 125/6 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 622.8, 622.9 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., Cis. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1995); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-5, 93-21-19 (1995); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-212 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-505 (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1994);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin 1994); OHIo R. EvlD. 601; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255
(1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913, 5914 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10.1 (1994); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.10 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 (1971); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1995); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-104
(1988). At least one jurisdiction has read the violence exception to require intentional harm to
the spouse. In Pennsylvania v. Dungan, 539 A.2d 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), the husband was
driving while intoxicated and caused an accident in which five people were killed. His wife, a
passenger in his vehicle, was seriously injured. The court held that the wife was not a competent
witness: "We believe the statute was not enacted to apply to the facts of this case... but instead
are persuaded the exception ... was designed to protect those Spouses victimized by an act of
intentional violence committed upon them by an accused spouse." Id. at 824.
157 MD. CODE ANN., Cis. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1995).
158 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 1994); see also IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1990) ("a
crime committed by violence by one against the person of the other"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57
(1994) ("assaulting or communicating a threat to the other spouse"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5913 (1995) ("criminal proceeding against either for bodily injury or violence attempted, done
or threatened upon the other").
159 OHIO R. EVID. 601 (emphasis added).
160 No. E-90-29, 1991 WL 137009 (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
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her by the hair, and tried to choke her. He also threatened to kill her.
Deneen ultimately decided not to press domestic violence charges
against her husband, and he was charged with disorderly conduct in-
stead. 61 The court held the following: "Appellant was charged with
the crime of disorderly conduct, a crime against appellant's entire
community. Appellant was not charged with a crime particularly
against Deneen Bass, such as domestic violence. Therefore, Deneen
Bass was not competent to testify against her husband."' 62
This case illustrates the problem with structuring spousal violence
exceptions in terms of crimes against a spouse. The rhetoric implies
that spousal violence is a private matter between the spouses, unlike
other crimes that are against the entire community. This minimizes the
importance of spousal violence, denying the community harm. The
reasoning likens wife beating to tort rather than crime, leaving it in
the hands of the plaintiff victim to bring the charges, produce the evi-
dence, and ultimately prosecute the case. When she refuses to do so,
we as a society can shrug and say, "Well, I guess it wasn't very impor-
tant or she would have done something about it." Thus, we deny the
personal harm to the victim as well as the harm to society as a whole.
As another example, consider Michigan's spousal immunity stat-
ute, which provides a spousal violence exception with the following
language: "A husband shall not be examined as a witness for or
against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her hus-
band without his consent, except.., where the cause of action grows
out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other."'163 The
Michigan courts have interpreted the "personal wrong or injury" lan-
guage very narrowly. In Michigan v. Quanstrom, 64 the supreme court
held that bigamy was not included within the statutory language of
"personal injury":
The language of the rule at common law was as broad as the language
"personal injury" in our statute, and that language meant, and was held
161 The disorderly conduct charge was not, according to the court's opinion, related to Neal
Bass's beating of Deneen. Rather, it related to the fact that when the police went to arrest him
at the home, they found him sitting on the stairs, highly intoxicated, with a forty-four magnum
pistol laying on the floor nearby. At that time, Neal Bass was alone in the house with the
couple's 15-month-old baby. The ordinance defined disorderly conduct to involve a voluntarily
intoxicated person engaging in conduct or creating a condition that presents a risk of physical
harm to himself or another, or to the property of another. The court held that when the7 police
found Bass on the stairs, "clearly, he presented a risk of physical harm to himself, to his baby, his
wife and even his neighbors." Bass, 1991 WL 137009, at *3.
162 Id. This comment suggests that the court does not view domestic violence as a crime
against the entire community, but rather, as a purely private matter between the husband and
wife.
163 MICH. COMP. LAvS ANN. § 600.2162 (West Supp. 1995). The Michigan statute also in-
cludes exceptions for criminal prosecution for a crime committed against the children of either
or both parents, for suits for divorce, and for criminal prosecution for bigamy. Id.
164 53 N.W. 165 (Mich. 1892).
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to mean, violence, either actual or constructive, to the person .... [T]he
wife was not allowed to give testimony in... any other crime not involv-
ing personal violence or corporeal injury to her .... A cause of action
growing out of a personal wrong is one designed to protect or secure
some individual right. The right, as well as the wrong, must pertain to
the person. It must be one that is purely personal in its character, and in
no sense can the exception here be said to embrace public wrongs, which
are personal only in the sense that they wound the feelings or annoy or
humiliate, but inflict no injury upon the person.165
In Michigan v. Love,166 the court continued to interpret "personal
injury" narrowly. Abner Love accused his estranged wife Sue of
"fooling around" with a co-worker, Johnny McQueen. He called Mc-
Queen over to his wife's house to discuss the relationship with Sue
Love. The three sat in McQueen's car, and Abner Love shot Mc-
Queen at close range in the temple. He then pushed the body out of
the car, took the driver's seat, pointed the gun in his wife's direction,
and threatened to harm her if she tried to leave. Love was charged
with murder in the death of McQueen and with the kidnapping of his
wife. Although a majority of the court held that Sue Love's testimony
was admissible in the kidnapping prosecution, the court also held that
her husband could assert the spousal privilege to prevent his wife's
testimony in the murder case.167 Rather than viewing the murder of
Sue Love's supposed boyfriend and her kidnapping as one continuous
act of spousal violence,168 the court held that killing McQueen in Sue
Love's presence was not a "personal wrong or injury done by one
[spouse] to the other" within the meaning of the statute.169
This narrow interpretation of spousal violence fails to recognize
commonly recurring patterns in battering relationships-threats and
assaults against men the batterer believes, because of pathological
jealousy, to be his wife's lover.170 Other jurisdictions have read their
165 Id. at 166. "In response to People v. Quanstrom... prosecutions for bigamy were ex-
cepted [from spousal disqualification] by 1897 P.A. 212." Michigan v. Love, 391 N.W.2d 738,742
(Mich. 1986).
166 391 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. 1986).
167 Id. at 742-45.
168 It is common for a batterer to act out of jealousy and to threaten or harm any man he
believes to be involved with his spouse. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
169 Love, 391 N.W.2d at 743. The court noted that some jurisdictions held otherwise. See 36
A.L.R.3d 820 (1970). In New Jersey v. Briley, 251 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1969), for example, the court
held that the wife was a competent and compellable witness in all cases arising out of a criminal
episode in which the husband murdered his wife's male companion and then assaulted his wife
with a gun. The Love court chose not to follow this case on the grounds that the New Jersey
spousal immunity statute used language different from the Michigan statute. The court also
found support in other jurisdictions that did not follow the rule permitting a witness-spouse to
testify concerning an offense committed against a third party when the defendant also committed
an offense against the spouse during the same criminal transaction. Love, 391 N.W.2d at 744
n.14.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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spousal violence exception broadly enough to include crimes commit-
ted by the husband against third persons, so long as the wife was also
victimized in the same transaction.171 In Ohio v. Mowery,172 the de-
fendant broke into the house of Harley Laughlin where Laughlin and
Mowery's estranged wife were sleeping. Mowery shot Laughlin and
Mrs. Mowery five times. Laughlin was killed, but Mrs. Mowery, se-
verely injured, survived.
Mowery was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated mur-
der of Laughlin, and attempted murder of his wife. The three charges
were tried together, and the trial court allowed Mrs. Mowery to testify
as to the burglary of Laughlin's residence and Laughlin's murder as
well as to her husband's attempt to murder her. On appeal, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that Mrs. Mowery was competent to testify as to
all three charges:
It is undisputed Mrs. Mowery was competent to testify as to the three
shots fired by appellee at her which resulted in the attempted murder
charge. Once it is established Mrs. Mowery is competent to testify as to
the second, fourth and fifth shots fired by the appellee, it would be ludi-
crous to fabricate a justification for excluding Mrs. Mowery's testimony
about the first and third shots, or the mechanics of appellee's entrance
into the Laughlin residence. These three crimes constitute one continu-
ous transaction or happening culminating in offenses against two individ-
uals. The three offenses were not well-defined and separate, but rather,
were overlapping and intertwined. Any attempt to extricate testimony
from Mrs. Mowery relating only to the attempted murder charge would
be highly artificial in view of the instant facts.173
Although the result in Mowery is more consistent with what we know
of the dynamics of domestic violence, the court relied on a
hypertechnical reading of the statute instead of upon a mature under-
standing of spousal violence. Pathological jealousy on the part of the
batterer is common in the well-known pattern of wife abuse.174 Thus,
breaking into Laughlin's house and murdering him can be understood
as an expression of spousal violence.
171 Some states explicitly provide in their spousal privilege statutes that the privilege cannot
be claimed in a criminal proceeding when a spouse is charged with a crime against a third person
committed in the course of a crime against the other spouse. See HAW. R. EVID. 505(c)(1)(D);
OR. REv. STAT. § 40.255(4)(a) (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.05(3)(b) (West 1993). Otherjuris-
dictions have achieved this result through judicial construction. See, eg., Colorado v. McGregor,
635 P.2d 912 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Iowa v. Bleeker, 327 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1982); State v.
Briley, 251 A.2d 442 (NJ. 1969); Washington v. Thompson, 564 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1977).
172 438 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio 1982).
173 Id. at 900. Of course, the trial court could have severed the attempted murder case from
the other two and tried the other two separately, as Mowery requested. This would have pre-
vented the "highly artificial" aspects of the testimony.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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C. States with Spousal Crime Exceptions
Some states have created exceptions to the spousal privilege for
other crimes against the testifying spouse, including property
crimes.175 Some jurisdictions have read statutes using "crime against
the other" to include certain property crimes. 176 For example, Wash-
ington overruled a line of cases requiring personal violence under sim-
ilar statutory language to apply the exception to burglary of the wife's
residence.177 Arson is also frequently held to fall within the "crime
against the spouse" language, particularly if, the wife was on the prem-
ises at the time of the fire.178
Virginia, however, has held that the exception does not apply to
arson. In Creech v. Commonwealth,179 Creech threatened to "torch"
his wife's belongings when she told him she was leaving him. He set
fire to his own house, which contained furniture that Mrs. Creech had
brought to the house when she married Creech. The court held that
"this case lacks an element essential for invocation of the statutory
exception to the general rule of spousal immunity-prosecution of an
offense committed by Creech against Mrs. Creech."' 8 0 Here, Creech
was charged only with burning down his own house, not with any
crime against his wife.
175 See ALASKA R. Evm. 505(a)(2)(D)(i); Amz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (1989); CAL
EVm. CODE §§ 972, 985 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107 (Supp. 1989); HAW.
R. EvID. 505; ILL COMp. STAT. ANN. 125/6 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 622.8,622.9
(West 1995); Ky. R. EvmD. 504(c)(2)(A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-17 (West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.42
(Baldwin 1994); Omo R. Evm. 601; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (1988); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Michie 1990); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-104
(1988).
176 Note that this is the same statutory wording that leads the Ohio court to require a "crime
particularly against [the wife], such as domestic violence," City of Huron v. Bass, No. E-90-29,
1991 WL 137009, at *2, (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 1991) (unpublished opinion), and the Michigan
court to require "violence, either actual or constructive, to the person," Michigan v. Love, 391
N.W.2d 738, 743 (Mich. 1986) (quoting Michigan v. Quanstrom, 53 N.W. 165, 256 (Mich. 1892)).
177 Washington v. Thornton, 835 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Wash. 1992). Thornton entered his wife's
home while she was at work by breaking a window to gain entry. Thornton proceeded to slash
his wife's waterbed with a butcher knife and stole her suitcase. See also Washington v. Kilponen,
737 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (exception applying when husband broke into his
wife's residence intending to tie her up and make her watch him commit suicide with the rifle he
had with him, because he attempted a crime of personal violence against his wife-unlawful
imprisonment).
178 Kansas v. Johnson, 621 P.2d 992 (Kan. 1981) (arson when husband set fire to residence of
another where he knew wife was residing); Michigan v. Butler, 424 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1988);
Pennsylvania v. John, 596 A.2d 834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (arson when wife was in the building,
for this constituted attempted violence against her); Washington v. Moxley, 491 P.2d 1326 (Wash.
1972) (arson when wife and child were in the residence).
179 410 S.E.2d 650 (Va. 1991).
180 Id. at 651.
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Like the cases involving personal violence, the property crimes
cases use rhetoric suggesting that these crimes are personal to the vic-
tim rather than crimes against the entire community. For example,
the emphasis in the arson cases in which spousal testimony is allowed
is on the fact that the spouse was present and therefore in danger.
Property crime exceptions are still structured in terms of crimes
against a spouse. Thus, even these property crimes are construed as
private matters between the spouses.
D. States with No Spousal Crime Exception
Only Missouri,' 8' the District of Columbia, 82 Georgia, 8 3 Louisi-
ana, 84 Massachusetts, 8 5 and Alabama'8 6 have no spousal crime ex-
ceptions to spousal immunity. Alabama states it succinctly: "The
husband and wife may testify either for or against each other in crimi-
nal cases, but shall not be compelled so to do."' 87 Under such a privi-
lege, an abused wife can choose to testify voluntarily against her
husband (even over his objection) but she cannot be compelled to tes-
tify.las These jurisdictions usually justify the lack of a spousal crime
exception on the ground that one is not needed when the wife has the
right to testify voluntarily. 189
A recent case, Louisiana v. Taylor,190 aptly presents the difficul-
ties that arise in a jurisdiction with no spousal violence exception.
181 Missouri's privilege, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
No person shall be incompetent to testify as a witness in any criminal cause or prosecution
... by reason of being the husband or wife of the accused... ; [no] wife or husband of [a
person on trial], shall be required to testify, but any such person may testify at his or her
option either on behalf of or against the defendant ....
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (Vernon 1987).
182 The District of Columbia statute reads as follows: "In civil and criminal proceedings, a
husband or his wife is competent but not compellable to testify for or against the other." D.C.
CODE ANNm. § 14-306(a) (1995).
183 "Husband and wife shall be competent but shall not be compellable to give evidence in
any criminal proceeding for or against each other." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-23 (Supp. 1994).
184 Louisiana provides that "[i]n a criminal case... a witness spouse has a privilege not to
testify against the other spouse." LA. R. EvrD. 505.
185 The Massachusetts statute reads as follows:
Any person ... may testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal ... except as follows:
... [e]xcept as otherwise provided in [child neglect statutes] and except in any proceeding
relating to child abuse, including incest, neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to
testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against the
other.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West Supp. 1995).
186 ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (1995).
187 Id.
188 DeBardeleben v. Alabama, 77 So. 979, 980 (Ala. 1918). See supra note 148 for a discus-
sion of the historical development of this statutory position.
189 See, eg., Louisiana v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160, 164 (La. 1994). See discussion of problems
associated with this view infra at text accompanying notes 280-314.
190 642 So. 2d 160 (La. 1994).
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Kenneth Taylor, a New Orleans police officer, was charged with ag-
gravated battery of Glenda Richard, whom he married after the beat-
ing and before trial. He beat Glenda with his fists, his police-issue
flashlight, and his 9mm Beretta service weapon. Several times he
forced the gun inside the victim's mouth and threatened to pull the
trigger. Glenda spent several days in the hospital following the as-
sault. While Glenda cooperated initially with the police and prosecu-
tion, she later told them that she wished to drop the charges.
At the time of preliminary hearing, the prosecution learned that
Glenda had married Kenneth ten days before the hearing. She re-
fused to testify, invoking her marital privilege. The trial court excused
the witness, remarking:
I think if this woman's crazy enough to want to get beat up by her hus-
band to within an inch of her life, and she wants to go back and marry
him, that's her business. And I couldn't stop her if she wanted to get up
on a ledge and jump off the building, if I wasn't close to her. It's her life.
I've seen the pictures. I think she's crazy. But what am I going to do?' 9 '
On appeal,192 the state asked the court to create an exception to the
spousal immunity privilege for crimes of violence against a spouse.
The state supreme court declined, noting that it could not justify
reading into the statute an exception purposely omitted by the legisla-
ture. The court did, however, recognize that the dynamics of spousal
abuse, e.g., fear, self-blame, and other emotional factors, often leave
the battered wife unable to make a sound judgment as to whether to
testify. "Exercise of the spousal witness privilege may be the result of
coercion, fear, subjugation, or undue influence, perhaps not even con-
sciously recognized by the abused spouse."'1 93 Thus, the court created
a narrow exception: when evidence shows that the spouse is invoking
the privilege because of fear, threats, or coercion, the trial court may,
in its discretion, consider the privilege inapplicable. 194 The court then
remanded for the trial court to develop further evidence and to deter-
mine whether the privilege should apply.
While the Louisiana Supreme Court's recognition of the dynam-
ics of domestic violence is commendable, their solution appears un-
realistic. The court's opinion contemplates a sensitive analysis of the
facts that would reveal even subtle coercion unrecognized by the bat-
tered wife. But consider that in this case, the assessment will be made
'by the trial court judge who believed the victim was a "crazy" woman
who "want[ed] to get beat up by her husband;" a trial judge who felt
that there was nothing he could (should) do because, after all, "it's her
191 Id. at 162.
192 The state prior to trial sought a writ in the court of appeals to reverse the trial court's
ruling so that Glenda would be required to testify. Id. at 163.
193 Id. at 166.
194 Id.
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life.' 95 This "sensitive analysis" is thus entrusted to a trial judge who
recited a panoply of myths concerning wife-beating. 196 A rule resting
on a trial court's discretion, when the trial judge is unaware of the
dynamics of domestic violence, is unlikely to benefit battered
women.197
E. Spousal Immunity in Other Common-Law Countries
Given the fact that United States jurisdictions acquired spousal
immunity doctrines through adoption of English common law, it
should come as no surprise that England, Canada, and Australia are
facing some of the same issues faced in United States jurisdictions
with regard to spousal immunity and spousal violence.
In England, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act provides that a
defendant's spouse is a competent and compellable witness in a case
in which "the offence charged involves an assault on, or injury or a
threat of injury to, the husband or wife."' 98 This statute changed prior
law. In Hoskyn v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,199 the husband
had inflicted serious injuries to his wife.200 The House of Lords held
that the wife could testify voluntarily, but was not a compellable wit-
195 ld. at 162.
196 Lenore Walker described and refuted the following myths about battered women: "Myth
No. 2: Battered women are masochistic." WALKER, supra note 28, at 20. "Myth No. 3: Battered
women are crazy." Id. at 20-21. "Myth No. 18: Battered women deserve to get beaten." Id. at
29. "Myth No. 19: Battered women can always leave home." Id. at 29-30. To this we can add
one more: "Domestic violence is a private matter between the spouses."
197 In Pennsylvania v. Hatfield, 593 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), the appellate court noted
that the wife was a compellable witness in a domestic violence case, but held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to compel the wife's testimony. The appellate court wrote:
In explaining its decision, the trial court found that the ends of justice would best be served
by granting the petition, apparently seeing the termination of the prosecution... as a means
of preserving the Hatfields' marriage. In so deciding, the court relied upon the assurances
of counsel, who stated that the circumstances giving rise to the criminal charges were
unique, and that the Hatfields had undertaken counseling to remedy the underlying causes
of their discord.
Id. at 1276. The appellate court recognized, however, the increasing numbers of cases in which
victimized spouses assert an unwillingness to testify. Thus, the court cautioned that an appropri-
ate record must be made to establish that the trial court properly exercised judicial discretion:
"As it is insufficient for a criminal whose victim is not his spouse to avoid prosecution by re-
course to therapeutic intervention, so perpetrators of domestic violence should not automatically
be exempt from punishment because they have sought counseling." Id. In another case of a
battered wife's reluctance to testify, the trial court, while telling the reluctant spouse that she had
to testify, also explained how she could avoid testifying-he advised the wife that although she
had to answer the prosecutor's questions, she could simply say she did not remember. Arizona
v. Anaya, 799 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. CL App. 1990).
198 Ian D. Brownlee, Compellability and Contempt in Domestic Violence Cases, 1990 J. Soc.
WELFARE L. 107, 107 (quoting Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, § 80(3)(a)).
199 [1979] App. Cas. 474.
200 She sustained two stab wounds to her chest, a nine-centimeter cut from her temple to her
right ear, smaller cuts to her lip and chin, and a four-centimeter cut on her left forearm. Id. at
499.
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ness. Lord Wilberforce recited the usual rule that the wife was not a
competent witness against her husband in a criminal case because to
allow a wife to give evidence against her husband "would give rise to
discord and to perjury and would be to ordinary people, repug-
nant."'201 He noted that the spousal violence exception would render
her competent to testify, but "the fact of marriage and her status as a
wife" would allow her to resist compulsion to testify.20 2 Compare this
with a Canadian court's opinion that "[a] rule which leaves the hus-
band or wife the choice of testifying is more likely to be productive of
family discord than to prevent it.'' 203 By statute in Australia a victim
spouse cannot refuse to testify in certain offenses, including crimes by
one spouse against the other.2°4
F. Summary and Future Implications
Undeniable progress has been made in restructuring the com-
mon-law doctrine of spousal immunity in order to combat domestic
violence. Because the testifying spouse is the holder of the privilege
in a majority of jurisdictions, she can testify voluntarily about spousal
abuse. In addition, in a majority of jurisdictions, the spousal violence
exception allows the prosecution to compel a reluctant wife's testi-
mony. Nonetheless, misunderstandings about what constitutes do-
mestic violence and about why battered wives are reluctant to testify
lead to injustice in a number of cases.
Spousal crime exceptions, structured in terms of crimes against a
spouse, employ rhetoric likening wife-beating to tort rather than
crime, leaving it in the hands of the plaintiff victim to bring the
charges, produce the evidence, and ultimately prosecute the case.
Narrow interpretations of what constitutes spousal violence under an
exception exacerbate the problem-disregarding what we know about
battering behavior allows courts to render hypertechnical judgments
201 Id. at 488; see also Susan Edwards, Compelling a Reluctant Spouse, 139 NEW L.J. 691
(1989).
202 Hoskyn, [1979] App. Cas. at 488. Viscount Dilhorne quoted with approval from counsel's
argument in another, similar case:
In the case of an ordinary person if he may be called as a witness, the usual consequences
follow, i.e., he must give evidence, but the wife has never, as regards her husband, been in
the position of an ordinary witness by reason of the common law, and she can no more be
compelled than the prisoner himself can be compelled.
Id. at 494. Only Lord Edmund-Davies wrote in dissent, asserting that the law as the majority
conceived it was "inimical to the public weal, and particularly so at a time when disturbing
disclosures of great violence between spouses are rife." Id. at 500.
203 Edwards, supra note 201, at 691 (quoting R. v. McGinty, 52 Crim. Rep. 3d 161 (1986)).
204 Id (citing the Crimes (Domestic Violence) Ordinance § 17 (1986); Crimes (Domestic Vio-
lence) Amendment Act amending § 407AA of the Crimes Act 1900). Edwards notes that the
Report of the New South Wales Task Force on Domestic Violence recommending compellability
argued that "the placing of a choice in the hands of the woman herself is almost an act of legal
cruelty." Id.
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ignoring the reality of battered women's lives. Violent and controlling
behavior such as stalking, threats, destruction of property, and vio-
lence against other men, magically becomes "public harm" (unlike
beating one's wife, which is private harm?) and thus outside the
exception.
One of the most promising legal reforms in fighting domestic vio-
lence is the development of protective orders.205 Virtually every state
now has domestic violence legislation providing for orders of protec-
tion for women abused by their husbands.206 "Using [protective or-
ders] to combat domestic violence anticipates a two-step process.
First the civil protection order is sought .... The second step ... is
enforcement. Once [an order] is obtained and served on an abuser,
violation of the order is a crime, enforced either by contempt proceed-
ings or ordinary criminal process. '20 7 However, it is likely that a state
with only a spousal violence exception will be unable to marshall evi-
dence to enforce the order in situations when the violation is short of
beating the wife.208
In an Ohio case, Raymond Eichenberger was charged with violat-
ing a protective order thirty times within six days.20 9 The court noted
that Ohio precedent allowed the wife to testify in cases in which the
wrongdoer injures his spouse.210 But here, the court said, the only
harm caused by the violations of the protective order was to the pub-
lic.2 1' The Eichenberger court made a clear distinction between public
harm and private harm; the private harm did not fall within the
spousal violence exception. In other jurisdictions following similar
reasoning, the spouse's testimony would be disallowed because it did
not involve spousal violence that was "personal" to the wife. Protec-
205 See Kin Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 163 (1993);
Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 3, at 1509-18.
206 Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders
Against Domestic Abuse 23 FAm. L.Q. 43, 43 (1989).
207 Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1404-05 (1991) (citing Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic
Abuse, 21 HARv. J. ON LEais. 61, 117, 122-23 (1984)).
208 A majority of states define violations of protective orders as a misdemeanor or other
crime. See Finn, supra note 206, at 160-61; see also Cheh, supra note 207, at 1404-06 (noting
criminal enforcement via contempt proceeding or violation of criminal statute). Thus, spousal
immunity would apply in this criminal proceeding like in any other.
209 City of Reynoldsburg v. Eichenberger, No. CA-3492, 1990 WL 52467, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 18, 1990) (unpublished opinion).
210 ld. (citing Ohio v. Antill, 197 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio 1964)).
211 The court ultimately allowed the wife's testimony on dual grounds: (1) the husband's fail-
ure to object to the testimony at trial was a waiver of the privilege; and (2) the refusal of testi-
mony would offend the clear legislative purpose in passing the domestic violence legislation,
which included an offense of violation of protective order. The court did not, however, consider
the exception for spousal violence. Id. at *3.
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tive orders provide little protection if violations cannot be established
in court. A right without a remedy is hollow indeed.
Those jurisdictions with no spousal violence exception at all sat-
isfy themselves by saying that the battered wife can always choose to
testify voluntarily. This smug approach ignores what we have learned
about why beaten women are reluctant to testify. The rule leaves the
wife to be manipulated by her husband and his attorney into invoking
her privilege not to testify. The legal system, once again, tells wife and
husband both that domestic violence is a private matter between the
two of them and that the state does not care to intervene.
IV. A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
Two commentators have noted that, despite frequent critiques of
the doctrine of spousal immunity, the doctrine has not been critiqued
from a feminist perspective.21 2 Perhaps the first question to be ad-
dressed is whether rules of evidence should be subjected to feminist
critique. Kit Kinports approaches the problem as follows:
212 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 93, § 5572, at n.338. The authors describe "proto-femi-
nist" attacks on the privilege and further state:
We use the term [proto-feminist] advisedly because, so far as we have been able to deter-
mine, no person self-identified as a "feminist" or "womanist" has ever written on the privi-
lege. Most of the people who make the argument discussed in the text appear to be men
without any great familiarity with feminist writing on the family (a class that includes the
present authors).
Id. The authors go on to say, "The question of whether or not the proto-feminist arguments are
truly 'feminist' may safely be left to those with better credentials for answering it." Id. at 512. In
a footnote, the authors state:
The remark in the text is not intended to suggest that we think a feminist analysis of the
privilege would not be worth considering. The problem is that so far as we are aware, no
feminist writer has ever addressed this issue. This means that we would have to attempt to
construct a feminist critique from our own readings of feminist writers. This would, we
think, be a foolhardy undertaking for persons who have just suggested that feminist analyses
from males are inherently suspect.
Id. at n.355; see also Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., What's the Matter with Evidence?, 25 LOYoLA
L.A. L. RaV. 773 (1992). Professor Graham remarks:
It is to be expected that evidence scholarship will be caught up in academic fads. But it is
remarkable that so far the law of evidence has been relatively untouched by recent ideologi-
cal fashions other than the so-called "law-and-economics" movement. Feminists, except for
some splendid early writing about character evidence in rape cases, have generally ignored
the law of evidence. Perhaps the desire to avoid self-ghettoization sometimes associated
with family law may explain why there is no womanist writing on spousal privilege. While
their sisters in science have been able to find sexist assumptions in the epistemology of the
men in white coats, surely it is reasonable to suppose that the same virus has infected those
in black robes.
Id. at 779-80. Professor Michael Seigel offers an alternative explanation for why feminist legal
thought, and other major intellectual movements, have left evidence scholarship virtually un-
touched. He traces the phenomenon to evidence scholars' near-universal acceptance of" 'opti-
mistic rationalism,' that is, the belief that the overarching function of evidence law is to
maximize the ... probability that factfinders in our adjudicatory system will accurately deter-
mine objective historical truth." Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modem Evidence
Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 995, 996 (1994) (footnote omitted). Because of this rationalist
perspective, evidence scholars fail to see any worth to feminist jurisprudential critique. Id.
1064
Spousal Immunity
The reader without a background in feminist theory may approach this
article [entitled Evidence Engendered] with some skepticism, wondering
how a feminist perspective can possibly be relevant to the study of "neu-
tral" procedural rules that are unrelated to the history of discrimination
against women.... I believe.., that the evidence rules are gendered in
a number of important respects but could be improved by including a
feminist perspective.213
This is not to say that there is only one feminist perspective, or only
one school of feminist legal thought.214 A common thread, however,
is a belief that the legal system, created by privileged white men, ig-
nores the reality of women's lives: "Feminists generally agree-it
should go without saying-that women suffer in ways which men do
not, and that the gender-specific suffering that women endure is rou-
tinely ignored or trivialized in the larger (male) legal culture. 215
Feminist jurisprudence, or feminist legal theory, is an attempt to ex-
amine "the relationship between law and society from the point of
view of all women. '216
213 Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 413-14.
214 Admittedly there has been a tendency in Western feminist thought to assume an essential
"womanness" that all women share despite racial, class, religious, ethnic, and cultural differ-
ences. See ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT at ix (1988); see also DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMODATION: ETHICAL FEMI-
NISM, DECONSTRUCrION, AND THE LAW 4-6 (1991) (critiquing Robin West and Catherine Mac-
Kinnon as essentialist). This tendency toward essentialism has resulted in a feminist movement
that is often meaningless for women who differ from the "essential woman." See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Whose Story Is I Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in
RACE-ING, JusTICE, EN-GENDERING POwER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND
THE CONSTRUCION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Lisa R. Green, Homeless
and Battered: Women Abandoned. by a Feminist Institution, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 169, 170
(1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581
(1990). Some see the 1980s for feminism as "a decade of intense mutual criticism and internal
divisiveness; a decade in which the feminist illusion of 'sisterhood' and the 'dream of a common
language' gave way to the realities of fractured discourses." CoHmcrs IN FEMINISM 1 (Mari-
anne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); NAOMI WOLFE, FIRE wrrH FIRE 57-132 (1993).
This "internal divisiveness" can be seen as strength rather than weakness in that feminism en-
compasses a diversity of ideas.
215 Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 81-82 (1987); see also Kinports, supra note
213, at 414; Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987);
Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1877,1906 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV.
617, 619 (1990); cf NANCY Co-r, THE GROUNDING OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 4-5 (1987) ("Men
and women are alike as human beings, and yet categorically different from each other, their
sameness and differences derive from nature and culture, how inextricably entwined we can
hardly know.").
216 Heather Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 64, 64 (1985) (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Panel Discussion, "De-
veloping Feminist Jurisprudence," at the 14th National Conference on Women and Law, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Apr. 9, 1983)).
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Evidence law should not be left out of this examination of the
relationship between law and society from the point of view of all wo-
men. No amount of legal "rights" will aid women if they (we) are
unable to procure admissible evidence by which to prove an issue in
court. Thus, rape shield rules2 1 7 and laws allowing the admission of
evidence of rape trauma syndrome 218 and battered women syn-
drome 19 are necessary predicates to accessing "justice" through the
courts. Another necessity is a law of spousal privilege that recognizes
the dynamics of spousal violence and the reality of women's lives.
A. Overview of Feminist Jurisprudence
Feminist jurisprudence is often broken down into three220 or
four221 general schools of thought, although attempting to sort and
classify the diversity of feminist legal theory leads to oversimplifica-
tion and distortion.222 Focusing on the differences in feminist legal
thought does, however, provide an organizational framework for an
overview of feminist jurisprudence. One can tentatively divide the
feminist legal movement into three principal strands: (1) liberal femi-
nism, (2) relational feminism, and (3) radical feminism.
1. Liberal Feminism. -Feminist theory that focuses on the ways
men and women are alike is perhaps the most familiar strand of femi-
nist legal thought. It is associated with the early years of the modem
American feminist movement and attempts to eradicate formal barri-
217 Rape shield laws were enacted in most jurisdictions during the 1970s. See Ann Althouse,
Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 757
(1992); Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763,765 n.3 (1986) (noting that rape shield rules have been
enacted by Congress and 48 state legislatures and created by judicial action in one other state).
218 Kansas v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1298-99 (Kan. 1982); Montana v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918,
923 (Mont. 1984).
219 See New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369-73, 377-78 (NJ. 1984); Fielder v. Texas, 756
S.W.2d 309, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); see also ANOELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WO-
MEN KILL passim (1987) (discussing the law's treatment of battered women's syndrome evi-
dence); cf. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (court's recognition of women's lack of
access to self-defense training and differences in size and strength as important in self-defense
law).
220 Christine Littleton analyzed feminist legal theory as "three interrelated theories to explain
and resist women's inequality." Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48
U. PIrt. L. REv. 1043, 1045 (1987). She sets out the three theories as (1) theories of sex discrimi-
nation, (2) theories of gender oppression, and (3) theories of sexual subordination. Ld. at 1045-
46.
221 Others have sorted theories of feminist legal thought into four categories: (1) equality or
sameness or liberal feminists, (2) "difference" feminists, (3) cultural feminists, and (4) radical
feminists. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 599,
626-29 (1989).
222 "The richness and diversity of feminist legal theory that has developed over the last two
decades is hard to reduce to a simple schema." Littleton, supra note 220, at 1045.
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ers that excluded women from employment and other areas of public
life.223 Liberal, or "sameness," feminism focuses on the ways in which
men and women are alike in arguing for particular treatment. The
line of thought goes something like this: If men enjoy fights that wo-
men want, then the only way for women to obtain these fights under
existing equal protection doctrine is to argue that, as to the right in
question, women are similarly situated to men.2 4
Critics of the sameness approach point out that in some ways wo-
men and men are different. Consider the one unquestionable differ-
ence between men and women-pregnancy. Christine Littleton
critiques the traditional concept of equality as assimilation to male
norms. She recognizes that equality doctrine has provided access for
some women to formerly male enclaves, like law firms, but notes that
this notion of equality does not allow challenges to the institutional
structure itself-
a structure that moves you off the partnership track if you call any atten-
tion to the fact that you are, either biologically or socially, female. You
could call attention to the fact that you are biologically female by doing
something as radical as having a baby. You could call attention to the
fact that you are acting in a socially female way by asking for parental
leave, whether you are a mother or a father. Despite significant progress
in combatting overt sex discrimination at the hiring stage, it seems clear
that young attorneys are moved off the "fast track" to partnership if they
behave in such a socially female manner.2 -5
Professor Littleton thus proposes a model of equality-equality as ac-
ceptance-that requires social institutions to react to gender differ-
ences so as to make those differences costless. For example, employers
223 See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373, 1374 (1986). For example, equality rhetoric-Aristotelian notions that likes should be
treated alike-persuaded the Supreme Court that a state statute that preferred men over women
as estate administrators amounted to impermissible sex discrimination. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). Equality feminists were also able to petition Congress, using equality rhetoric, to
eradicate barriers to equal opportunity in employment, housing, credit, and education. For ex-
ample, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) and the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), provide that employers cannot discriminate in hiring,
firing, promotion, or pay on the basis of gender. In 1968, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3604-3676 (1994), and in 1974 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994),
attacked sex discrimination in sale or rental of housing and with respect to any credit transac-
tion. In 1972, the Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994), prohibited sex discrimina-
tion in federally funded educational programs. See also Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights
Through Litigation: An Examination of the ACLU Women's Rights Project, 1971-76, 8 COLUM.
HuM. Rrs. L. REV. 373 (1976); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and
Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161; Nadine Strossen, The ACLU and Women's
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1940 (1991).
224 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803,817-19
(1990); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cultur Courts, and Femi-
nism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982).
225 Littleton, supra note 220, at 1051-52.
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could be required to restructure workplaces to fit female life patterns
to the same extent they fit male ones.2 6 Littleton views her proposal
as incorporating and transcending traditional sex discrimination the-
ory "by insisting that equality need not be limited to sameness, but
can in fact be applied across difference. ' 227
2. Relational Feminism.-A discussion of relational feminism,
sometimes called cultural feminism 2 8 or "different voice" feminism,
must begin with the work of psychologist and researcher Carol Gilli-
gan. Gilligan discovered that psychological theory about the moral
development of humans was developed from tests and observations of
boys and men.2 9 When she began to explore how girls and women
resolved moral dilemmas she discovered "a different voice," one here-
tofore ignored in psychological literature. Gilligan reported that boys
resolved conflicts by employing a "hierarchical ladder of values," 23 0
while girls used a very different reasoning process, an "ethic of care,"
focused on preserving relationships. 23 1 Gilligan argues that girls and
women see "a world comprised of relationships rather than of people
standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather
than through systems of rules. '232
The relevance of this psychological work to law is obvious. Femi-
nist legal scholars have used Gilligan's work to argue that law is an
essentially male discourse, with the woman's voice marginalized. Law
operates within Gilligan's male-identified "hierarchy of rights" instead
of the female-identified "ethic of care. '233
226 Id. at 1052. Littleton views "male" and "female" as social constructs:
A society constructed from the male point of view is acting quite rationally when it first
constructs the social categories of "male" and "female" and then says to those who it has
defined as female, "All you have to do to be included is to prove that you 'really' are the
same as we are." In other words, "prove that you really belong in the category that we have
constructed in order to exclude you."
Id. at 1051. She also views "equality" and "inequality" as created concepts rather than natural
ones. Thus, in her view redefining those terms is less than radical. Id. at 1052.
227 Id. at 1057. See infra text accompanying note 241 for a radical feminist's critique of both
sameness and difference doctrines.
228 Gary Minda explains the denomination of "cultural feminism" as follows: "Feminists who
advocate the different voice perspective have been called 'cultural feminists' because they tend
to equate women's liberation with the development and maintenance of a female-centered
counterculture." Minda, supra note 221, at 627.
229 CAROL J. GILLIGAN, IN A DiFERENT VoicE 24-63 (1982); see also Isabel Marcus et al.,
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-a Conversation, 34 Bum'. L. REV. 11, 39-40
(1985) (panel discussion including comments by Carol Gilligan).
230 GILLIGAN, supra note 229, at 26.
231 Id. at 28.
232 Id. at 29.
233 Marcus et al., supra note 229, at 51-54 (comments of Carrie Menkel-Meadow); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 39 (1985); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in
Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886
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Gilligan's work has not, however, been free from criticism by
legal feminists. Catharine MacKinnon disputes the attribution of the
"ethic of care" to women as if it is women's voice rather than "what
male supremacy has attributed to us for its own use.' '234
Women value care because men have valued us according to the care we
give them, and we could probably use some. Women think in relational
terms because our existence is defined in relation to men. Further, when
you are powerless, you don't just speak differently. A lot, you don't
speak. Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is silenced.23 5
Further, the "essentialist" tendency of Gilligan's work-its attempt to
define all women and all men-is troubling, particularly in a society in
which the difference between the sexes is seen as an excuse to discrim-
inate against women. Ann Scales cautions that Gilligan's work could
become "the Uncle Tom's Cabin of our century. '23 6
3. Radical Feminism. -Radical feminism sees gender inequality
not as the result of mistaken differentiation based on gender, but as
the result of the systematic social subordination of women.23 7 Perhaps
the best known "radical feminist" is Catharine MacKinnon, who has
called radical feminism the only true feminism-feminism unmodi-
fied.23 8 She explains gender as an "inequality of power," and posits
that the differences society attributes to sex are lines drawn by
inequality.239
MacKinnon argues that "sex equality" is something of an oxymo-
ron, because sex presupposes difference and equality presupposes
sameness.2' ° She criticizes the sameness and difference approaches to
equality for their reliance on the male standard as the reference point:
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his
measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to
our lack of correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our
(1989). Kit Kinports suggests that evidentiary privileges are "feminist" in that they recognize
relationships. Kinports, supra note 213, at 440. This is certainly a "relational feminist" perspec-
tive of privileges. Kinports does point out that the privileges recognize only certain relation-
ships-"relationships accorded a high status by traditional, male norms." Id. at 441. She also
notes the patriarchal assumptions about women that mark the origins of the marital privilege.
Id. at 441 n.163.
234 MAcKiNNON, supra note 14, at 39.
235 Id.
236 Scales, supra note 223, at 1381.
237 MAcKiNNoN, supra note 14, at 42.
238 CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMrINIsT THEORY OF THE STATE 117 (1989)
("Feminism has been widely thought to contain tendencies of liberal feminism, radical feminism,
and socialist feminism. But just as socialist feminism has often amounted to traditional marxism
... liberal feminism has been liberalism applied to women. Radical feminism is feminism."); see
also MAcKiNNON, supra note 14, at 15-16.
239 MAcKiNNON, supra note 14, at 8.
240 Id. at 33.
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distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male
standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard,
but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for
both.241
Under the theory of radical feminism, women are unequal because
they are subordinate. MacKinnon's solution, of necessity, is to dis-
mantle the hierarchy that disempowers women, thus equalizing the
power between men and women.242
MacKinnon's feminist theory identifies sex as the sits of wo-
men's oppression: "Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism:
that which is most one's own, yet most taken away. '243 Thus, Mac-
Kinnon views the objectification of women-and sexuality in gen-
eral-as a central cause of sexual subordination.244 A frequent chal-
lenge to MacKinnon's work comes from feminists who do not share
her view of sexuality. Robin West argues that MacKinnon ignores wo-
men who find the experience of dominance and submission "sexually
desirable, exciting and pleasurable-in fantasy for many; in reality for
some."245 Patricia Cain suggests that MacKinnon's view that all wo-
men are dominated by men all the time discounts the experience of
lesbians who are often free from male domination in that they live
their private lives removed from the intimate presence of men.246
B. A Feminist Critique
With this basic understanding of the theories of feminist legal
thought, it is clear that a feminist critique of the spousal immunity
doctrine must address the legal theories as well as the reality of wo-
men's lives. Feminist critique is necessarily experiential, calling for
"theory without Theory[,] ... fewer universal frameworks and more
contextual analysis." 247
1. The Private-Public Dichotomy. -"Historically, the dichot-
omy of 'public' and 'private' has been viewed as an important con-
struct for understanding gender.' 248 Early struggles for women's
241 Id. at 34.
242 West, supra note 215, at 84.
243 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for The-
ory. 7 SIGNS 515, 515 (1982).
244 Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 835 (1988) (re-
viewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
245 West, supra note 215, at 116-17.
246 Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 191, 202-03 (1989-90).
247 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 316 (1989).
248 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 976 (1991); see
also Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv. 955, 967 (1993)
("The 'public-domestic distinction' arose as a deeply gendered ideological construct associating
1070
Spousal Immunity
rights, exemplified by the suffrage movement, protested women's ex-
clusion from the public sphere.249 Denying women the vote and bar-
ring them from numerous occupations all but forced women to remain
in their "separate sphere"-the home.25 0 The private sphere of the
home was seen as a place of refuge, a haven in a heartless public world
of politics and business.25 1 Even the U.S. Constitution was inter-
preted to recognize a "private realm of family life which the state can-
not enter. '25 2
Feminists have long realized that the absence of the state, of law,
from the private sphere has itself contributed to male dominance and
female subordination.25 3 "The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated
the female world from the legal order sends an important ideological
message to the rest of society. It devalues women and their functions
and says that women are not important enough to merit legal
regulation." 25 4
The battered women's movement has been, in the past twenty
years, enormously successful in bringing the "private" problem of wife
abuse to public attention and in igniting an explosion of law reform
efforts to assist battered women.25 5 However, wife abuse continues
and there is much social resistance to change. Elizabeth Schneider
explains the resistance as follows:
Battering is deeply threatening. It goes to our most fundamental as-
sumptions about the nature of intimate relations and the safeness of
family life. The concept of male battering of women as a "private" issue
exerts a powerful ideological pull on our consciousness because, in some
sense, it is something that we would like to believe. By seeing woman-
abuse as "private," we affirm it as a-problem that is individual, which
only involves a particular male-female relationship, and for which there
is no social responsibility to remedy. 25 6
Despite the existence of some legal remedies that bring domestic vio-
lence into the public sphere, spousal immunity is often justified on the
ground of privacy interests.25 7 Under this justification, a spouse who
the amorality of the public sphere with men and the morality of the private sphere with
women.").
249 Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 T-X. L. REV.
387,392 (1984); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THm PoLrncs OF LAW 151, 151-52 (David Kairys ed., rev. 1990).
250 Olsen, supra note 249, at 392.
251 Dailey, supra note 248, at 966-67 (citing CmusToPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS
WoRLn: THm FAMILY BESEIGED (1979)).
252 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), cited in Dailey, supra note 248, at 984.
253 Taub & Schneider, supra note 249, at 154.
254 Schneider, supra note 248, at 978.
255 id. at 974.
256 Id. at 983 (footnote omitted).
257 Courts presented with a constitutional privacy argument in support of the privilege have
consistently rejected it. See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
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testifies voluntarily violates a defendant spouse's privacy interest in
"prevent[ing] dissemination of any personal information."'258 The use
of contempt powers to compel a reluctant spouse's testimony consti-
tutes blatant governmental intrusion into private relationships. 25 9
Spousal immunity, especially in cases of domestic violence, can be
seen as a way to leave that violence back in the private sphere.
Courts' interpretations of spousal violence exceptions rely on distinc-
tions between private and public harm. While other crimes may be
considered public harm, domestic violence is "personal" to the victim.
Courts applying the spousal violence exception fall back on traditional
notions of the public-private dichotomy.
Further, the argument that the government should not compel a
reluctant spouse to testify is merely a version of the traditional argu-
ment that the law does not belong in the private sphere of family rela-
tions. Nonetheless, there is something unsettling in the picture of a
battered woman jailed for contempt as a consequence of her refusal to
testify against her husband.260 This is the dilemma feminists face:
The freedom promised by the right to privacy runs up against women's
right to security in the home, and rights rhetoric cannot decide the con-
flict. Any effort to protect women from private oppression by their hus-
bands may expose them to public oppression by the state; any effort to
keep the state out of our personal lives will leave us subject to private
domination. 261
Although much good has inured to the cause of women through
the doctrine of privacy,262 the privacy doctrine has also encouraged,
reinforced, and supported violence against women:
Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313,1319 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 284 (1980); United States v. Doe,
478 F.2d 194, 195 (1st Cir. 1973). However, arguments about privacy are frequently offered as
rationales for one or both of the marital privileges. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and
Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE LJ. 45, 47; Lee W.
Borden, In Defense of the Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications, 39 ALA. LAW. 575,
581 (1978); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion; Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 110 (1956); Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Preroga-
tives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital
Privilege, 61 CAL L. REv. 1353, 1370-71 (1973); Jaymi B. Zwain, Note, Privilege Against Adverse
Spousal Testimony-In a Federal Criminal Proceeding Choice of Whether to Testify Against a
Defendant Spouse Belongs to Witness Spouse Alone, 55 TuL L. REv. 961,970 (1981); Privileged
Communications, supra note 94, at 1584-85; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 94, § 5572,
at 493-95.
258 Privileged Communications, supra note 94, at 1583 (citing Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Inter-
personal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64
GEo. L.J. 613, 648 (1976)).
259 Id. at 1584-85.
260 See Waits, supra note 39, at 323 & n.317 (citing John Riley, Spouse-Abuse Victim Jailed
After No-Drop Policy Invoked, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 4).
261 Olsen, supra note 249, at 393.
262 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(contraception); see also Jean L. Cohen, Redescribing Privacy: Identity, Difference and the Abor-
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Privacy says that violence against women is immune from sanction, that
it is permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of American fam-
ily life. Privacy says that what goes on in the violent relationship should
not be the subject of state or community intervention. Privacy says that
it is an individual, and not a systemic problem. Privacy operates as a
mask for inequality, protecting male violence against women. 263
As Deborah Rhode notes, "the state's refusal to intervene in private
matters has not necessarily expanded individual autonomy; it has
often simply substituted private for public power. '264
2. The (Mis)Value of Autonomy.-In critiquing liberal femi-
nism, Robin West argues that liberal-legal feminism mistakenly fo-
cuses on autonomy and maximizing choice as its strategy for achieving
equality between men and women.265 This focus on choices is misdi-
rected, she argues, in that it directs critical attention outward rather
than inward. West suggests that feminist legal theory should posit
subjective happiness as the direct goal of legal reform and subjective
suffering as the direct evil to be eradicated. She recognizes that lib-
eral feminists are concerned about women's subjective well-being, but
seek to achieve it indirectly by changing the objective, external condi-
tion of lack of choices. 266 Liberal feminism assumes that human be-
ings will choose what will make them happy, and thus expanding
women's choices will expand their happiness. 267 Professor West does
not find "women" in the liberal's definition of "human being. '268 She
contends that the liberal feminist claim that women consent to trans-
actions in order to maximize happiness may be false. "It may be that
women consent to changes so as to increase the pleasure or satisfy the
desires of others. '269
The rather inescapable fact is that much of the misery women endure is
fully "consensual." That is, much of women's suffering is a product of a
tion Controversy, 3 CoLum. J. GENDER & L. 43 (1992) (criticizing feminist critiques of the right
of privacy); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLtuM. J. GENDER & L. 119 (1992)
(reaffirming legitimacy of right to privacy arguments).
263 Schneider, supra note 248, at 984-85.
264 Rhode, supra note 215, at 631. Invocation of privacy to support spousal immunity also
ignores the many invasions of government on the privacy of families and women. Anne C. Dai-
ley has challenged the notion that family is a "private" sphere free from government regulation.
She argues that "the modem family has never constituted a purely private institution, but has
always been subject to state regulation and public control." Dailey, supra note 248, at 994.
Although Dailey's article focuses on constitutional privacy, her thesis can inform discussions of
other aspects of legal regulation of the family.
265 vest, supra note 215, at 83.
266 Id. at 87-88.
267 Id.; see also Dailey, supra note 248, at 1004 ("The liberal conception of abstract individual-
ism, under which individuals interact as independent, autonomous, rational equals, has no con-
nection to family life, where individuals are, above all, dependent, related, and unequal.").
268 West, supra note 13, at 4 ("Women, though, are not human beings.").
269 West, supra note 215, at 92.
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state of being which was itself brought into being through a transaction
to which women unquestionably tendered consent. A woman's experi-
ence of marital sexuality, for example, may range from boring to irritat-
ing to invasive to intensely painful.... But the fact is that.., the wife
... was [not] brought to the altar in shackles.... Put affirmatively, the
conditions which create our misery-unwanted pregnancies, violent and
abusive marriages, sexual harassment on the job-are often traceable to
acts of consent. Women-somewhat uniquely-consent to their
misery.270
Women are different from men, in acting for the benefit of others
rather than themselves, because their lives are different from those of
men. Professor West believes that several factors explain this differ-
ence: biological pregnability and social training as primary caretakers
are two. She focuses on another explanation for the difference that
she thinks "has great explanatory force" -pervasive violence in the
lives of women.271 Violence, particularly sexual violence, causes wo-
men to "define themselves as 'giving selves' so as to obviate the
threat, the danger, the pain, and the fear of being self-regarding selves
from whom their sexuality is taken. '272
Professor West's analysis is particularly germane to domestic vio-
lence. She reveals her own experience in a violent intimate relation-
ship, and notes that the total fear that accompanies daily violence in
the home taught her "to view as literally incongruous the mere sugges-
tion that I should expect to reap pleasure for myself from anything at
all.... The notion that I would act-or consent-so as to further my
own welfare or to create pleasure for myself was both inconceivable
and unconceived. ''273
Kathleen Waits has also addressed the question of the proper
weight prosecutors and judges should give to the battered wife's ex-
pressed wishes.274 She suggests that the victim's views "should be ac-
corded great deference when she wants the law to take action against
the batterer, but should be given less weight when she says she wants
to protect him."275 She notes that "because of learned helplessness[,J
expressions of disinterest in deterring him are far less likely to repre-
sent the true state of her feelings than when she claims the con-
verse. '276 Waits also recognizes that sometimes the legal system,
270 Id. at 92-94.
271 Id. at 94.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 98.
274 Waits, supra note 39, at 306-07.
275 Id. at 307.
276 Id.; see also Debbie S. Holmes, Note, Marital Privileges in the Criminal Context: The Need
for a Victim Spouse Exception in Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 504, 28 Hous. L. REv. 1095,
1111-19 (1991) (suggesting that psychological effects of domestic abuse may render the victim
incapable of making a logical, rational choice regarding invocation of the spousal privilege).
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having a duty to deter batterers and to protect their wives and chil-
dren, has an obligation to act even when the victim refuses to help.277
Arguments in support of spousal immunity relying on the value
of autonomy2 78 seem almost cruel in light of Professor West's critique.
One commentator states that the "privilege is best served by leaving
the decision as to its invocation in the hands of the victim." 279 The
privilege may be "best served," but is the battered wife best served?28 0
Professor West suggests the following standard for analyzing laws:
"[A] law is a good law if it makes our lives happier and less painful
and a bad law if it makes us miserable, or stabilizes the conditions that
cause our suffering."281 Under this standard, a spousal privilege that
allows the husband to threaten or manipulate his battered wife into
invoking the privilege-thus insulating him from criminal liability-is
a bad law.
3. The Reality of Women's Lives.-"The starting point of femi-
nist work must be found in women's lives and not in legal defini-
tions. ''282 Thus, feminism's method is consciousness-raising-"the
collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's social ex-
perience, as women live through it."283 In forging an appropriate
spousal immunity law, then, it is important to consider the law's im-
277 Waits, supra note 39, at 307.
278 "Autonomy" arguments ignore the fact that being a witness to a crime renders one less
than autonomous, in that the state is ordinarily free to compel any person to testify. See supra
notes 83-91 and accompanying text. Further, autonomy arguments fail to address the hypocrisy
of allowing choice when the crime is against the spouse, but not allowing choice when the crime
is against some person the state is willing to protect. Child welfare arguments are, of course,
persuasive when a spouse commits a crime against a minor child. The state's interest in protect-
ing children clearly outweighs an interest in preserving marriage. When a young child needs an
adult's testimony in order to convict an abuser and thereby prevent further abuse, notions of
choice and autonomy vanish. The argument breaks down, however, when autonomy gives way
when an adult, fully competent child is abused. Nonetheless, a number of jurisdictions have
interpreted their spousal immunity provisions to allow state compulsion of a reluctant spouse
when one spouse is charged with a crime against an adult child. California v. McGraw, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 461,463 (Ct. App. 1983); Michigan v. Simpson, 347 N.W.2d 215,217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984),
vacated, 380 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. 1985); Ohio v. Abd' Allah Abd' Rahman, No. CA-2210,1984 WL
7547 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1984) (unpublished opinion), rev'd, 492 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1986).
279 33 STEVEN GOODE ET AL, TEXAs RuLEs OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 504.8, at
278 (1988).
280 This is not to suggest that the battered wife should be made to testify "for her own good."
She should be made to testify; every witness to a crime must testify for society is offended by the
crime and has an interest in bringing the miscreant to justice.
281 West, supra note 215, at 142.
282 Introduction to Special Issue: Feminist Perspectives on Law, 14 INT'L J. Soc. L. 233 (1986).
Deborah Rhode explains the importance of experiential analysis to critical feminism: "A stan-
dard practice [of critical feminism] is to begin with concrete experiences, integrate these exper-
iences into theory, and rely on theory for a deeper understanding of the experiences." Rhode,
supra note 215, at 621; see also Cain, supra note 246, at 195.
283 MAcKNNON, supra note 238, at 83.
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pact on the lives of women. How does women's experience of vio-
lence in marriage differ from the law's conception of that experience?
Is it empowering or disempowering for the state to take the decision
out of a woman's hands and force her to testify? Will it expose her to
violent retaliation from her abuser? Will she feel she must lie on the
witness stand, subjecting herself to perjury prosecution? 28 4 Will she
refuse to testify, and be jailed for contempt?
In a series of interviews with fifteen domestic violence victims at
shelters in Dallas and Tarrant Counties, Texas, Marina Mata-de la
Garza285 asked women about their experiences with spousal violence:
Q: Define domestic violence.
A: HELL.28 6
A: When physical force is used to make a point, get your way.8
When getting into specifics, the victims revealed a variety of battering
behaviors:
Q: What did he do?
A: [After explaining that she had been in three abusive relationships]
... The first one he knocked me down and made my head bleed. The
second one stomped on me, pulled a wad out of my hair, choked me so
hard I almost lost my breath and he cut me with a knife. The third one
... pushed me down and knocked me to the floor, and I hit my head,
neck, and back. He would also threaten to kick me out of my home, and
he would sexually assault me.2
In describing how she felt the first time her husband hit her, one wo-
man described her guilt and talked about shouldering the responsibil-
ity: "Guilty, responsible, why couldn't I have shut up? Maybe if I
284 I ask this question only because others who have read this Article have raised it. The
question comes uncomfortably close to frequently expressed ideas that women lie about abuse.
See Mack, supra note 12, at 329 ("The law's lack of belief in women's stories can be seen as a
direct manifestation. .. of male dominance.... [Miany of men's stories about women-the
myths and stereotypes-have become part of the law's story about women."); Torrey, supra note
12, at 1045.
285 See supra note 16.
286 Interview with H.B., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995). H.B. is a 72-year-old former nurse with
four adult children.
287 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995). D.W. has two children, divorced her
first abusive husband, and is now married to another abuser.
288 Interview with H.B., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995). A similar story is told by a 23-year-old
who has also been involved in three abusive relationships: "The first one he broke a tooth, hit me
on the head, choked me, [and] punched me. The second one he drove me to a field and beat me
up. And the third one was mainly emotional and verbal. He called me names like whore, slut,
and bitch and tell [sic] me I was no good. I think the second one was the worst one because he
held a gun to my head and laughed about it." Interview with M.D., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
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wouldn't have pushed it, he wouldn't have gotten so mad." 28 9 She
offered this explanation for why her husband abused 290 her:
He accused me of sleeping around and being unfaithful. I guess he'd hit
me because of anger, frustration and hurt and sometimes he had been
drinking. After it happened, he would say he was sorry and say, "If you
wouldn't have made me so angry .... "291
Most of the women offered excuses for why their husbands beat them.
Several said their husbands' drug or alcohol use was to blame.292
The women were asked about a pending change in Texas law,
creating a spousal violence exception to the spousal immunity privi-
lege that would allow compulsion of testimony.293 Almost all of the
women said they felt the new rule would be a good idea, and all of
them said they would tell the truth if they did testify.2 94 One woman
said she definitely would not testify if she were given a choice:
If I had any choice, I can honestly say, based on any experience with
abuse that I have been involved with, I would not have testified. And,
no, I don't think fear would have played a part in my decision not to
testify.2 9
5
Most of the women were aware of the spousal privilege in Texas that
allowed the wife to testify voluntarily but did not allow the state to
compel her testimony. They were then asked about the new rule:
Q: Suppose the law had changed and you would no longer have the
right to invoke the spousal privilege, and you had no choice but to testify
against your abuser. What would you have done?
A: I don't know. If I would have had no choice, I guess I would have
had to testify, but I wouldn't have liked it. The problem is that the feel-
ings of being scared, angry, hurt, etc., go away just like the bruises, and
289 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995). Other women similarly spoke about
feelings of guilt. D.L.P. explained that she could not leave her abuser sooner because she felt
guilty that he was ill-he was manic depressive and would beat her when he did not take his
medicine. Interview with D.L.P., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995). M.C. also said the beatings made
her feel guilty. Interview with M.C., supra note 16 (Feb. 24, 1995).
290 D.W. did not like the word "beatings"; she preferred to talk about "abuse." Interview
with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995).
291 Id.
292 Interview with I.H., supra note 16 (March 27,1995): "He would hit me when he was drunk
or stoned or when he was angry that he had no money." Interview with J.S., supra note 16
(March 28, 1995): "He was a drug addict."
293 Under the old Texas statute, the wife could testify voluntarily but could not be compelled
to testify. TEx. R. CRm. Evro. 504. Effective September 1, 1995, the state can compel the
victim spouse's testimony when an offense is committed against her by the other spouse. TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.10 (West Supp. 1996).
294 Girlfriends of abusers cannot claim the privilege and thus have often had to testify even
when reluctant. One prosecutor in Dallas County said in an interview that she has never had a
reluctant girlfriend lie-or at least tell a story different from the story she first told the police-
on the witness stand. Interview with Cynthia Findahl, Domestic Violence Unit, Dallas County
District Attorney's Office (March 21, 1995). The implications of this for any spousal violence
exception which may be enacted in the future are obvious.
295 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (February 21, 1995).
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then I wouldn't feel like I should punish him, even though I know that
being abused was and is wrong.... It is very easy, when you care about
someone more than you care about yourself, to not want to punish them.
It's easier to pretend that it didn't happen, that it will go away, [and] that
it will change, never happen again.296
A: Yes, [I would have testified because] everyone should be required to
talk about their abuse.297
A: It should be a mandatory law .... It would force women to come
clean.2 9
8
While some commentators express concern that compelling the vic-
tim's testimony will undermine battered women's attempts at empow-
erment,299 several interviewees seemed to consider it liberating that
the state would remove the choice from them:
A: Yes, I would testify for the children.... I would feel relief and testi-
fying against him might make him go for help.300
A: Absolutely.... I could have gotten on with my life sooner.301
A: It would help me make a decision quicker.30 2
These responses are consistent with those commentators who believe
that victims may be empowered by seeing their abusers prosecuted303
and by seeing that the state takes seriously their problems.3o4 Further,
women's empowerment can occur when men admit in court what they
have done-transforming the violence from "a private familial matter,
for which many women blame themselves, to a public setting where
men are made accountable for their acts. '305
Only one woman said it was probable that she would not testify
even if the law required it.306 One said she would testify only if she
could get protection.30 7 Several others also expressed safety concerns
296 Id.
297 Interview with G.P., supra note 16 (Mar. 28, 1995).
298 Interview with H.B., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
299 Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 3, at 1541.
300 Interview with N.T., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
301 Interview with D.L.P., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
302 Interview with I.H., supra note 16 (Mar. 27, 1995).
303 Cf. Angela West, Prosecutorial Activism: Confronting Heterosexism in a Lesbian Battering
Case, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 249, 255-56 (1992) ("I believe that the victim is empowered by
seeing the defendant prosecuted.... Seeing the abuser in a position of social disapproval may
be the first step toward realizing that there is help available ....").
304 Cf. Waits, supra note 39, at 323 (arguing that no-drop policies convey the message that
domestic violence is a crime against the public order, not just the victim).
305 Schneider, supra note 248, at 990-91 (citing Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Re-
straining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (E. Buzawa ed., 1992)).
The latter authors also suggest that empowerment occurs "when attorneys listen to battered
women, giving them time and attention, and when judges understand their situations, giving
them support and courage." Chaudhuri & Daly, supra, at 246.
306 Interview with M.D., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
307 Interview with R.E.H., supra note 16 (Mar. 28, 1995).
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if they did testify: "I would be scared that he'll try to get revenge. '308
Several seemed to feel that their abusers would hurt them whether or
not they testified, or that there was nothing worse the abuser could
do:
Q: If the law was changed making it so that women had no choice but to
testify would you have?
A: Maybe. I would be too scared.... [But] he has hurt me so much I'm
calloused now.309
Q: What would he have done in your opinion?
A: What could he have done? I don't think I would have been scared
that he would have hurt me more, or been more violent, although I guess
that's a possibility. I know he would have not wanted me to testify, but
if the decision to testify or pursue charges was not a choice, then the
situation is out of one person's control .... Maybe, if the choice had
been taken out of my hand, then I wouldn't have stayed in the relation-
ship, which would have made my life take a different course.310
Fear of retaliation is frequently expressed by women faced with the
decision whether to testify.311 While this fear should not be mini-
mized,312 some current empirical data suggest that prosecution does
not increase the victim's risk of being subjected to repeat violence.313
In fact, one study by David Ford and Mary Jean Regoli found that
prosecutorial action through an initial court hearing significantly re-
duced the chance of further violence during the first six months after
disposition of the case.314
While the Ford and Regoli study does not specifically address the
issue of whether the victim testifies, its results do lend support to the
notion that requiring the victim to testify will not subject her to fur-
ther violence. In fact, some batterers may cease harassing their victim
308 Interview with S.V.C., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
309 Interview with A.A., supra note 16 (Apr. 1, 1995).
310 Interview with D.W., supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1995).
311 As one battered woman observed:
I was afraid every second. If I refused to testify he would maybe not blame me for getting
arrested. If I testified and he didn't get convicted he'd have more power over me than ever
before. If I testified and he didn't get jail time, I'd be in the same boat. It seemed like there
were about eight scenarios that would go against me and only one that would work out.
Corsilles, supra note 4, at 873 (citing Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in
Duluth:- Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abu-
sive Relationships, 15 HAML.rNE L. REv. 115, 130 (1991)).
312 Martha Mahoney has named as "separation assault" the batterer's "urgent control moves
that seek to prevent the woman from ending the relationship." Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1991).
313 David A. Ford, Preventing and Provoking Wife Battery through Criminal Sanctioning: A
Look at the Risks, in ABUSED AND BATrERED, supra note 20, at 207-08.
314 David A. Ford & Mary J. Regoli, The Preventive Impacts of Policies for Prosecuting Wife
Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, supra note
305, at 193.
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after they realize she no longer controls the case.315 Testimony at
hearings conducted by the Texas Gender Bias Task Force support this:
I'm working with a client right now who was battered by her husband
severely.... She did file charges against the man. However, because of
his threats, he was able to convince her to drop the charges.
In our judicial system, as it stands, a spouse cannot be forced to testify
against the other spouse unless it's a case of child abuse.... Therefore,
the court puts the burden on the woman for going through with the
charges, which gives the batterer a wedge to use. [What i]f the courts
took the decision out of the woman's hands and the courts went ahead
and said, "No, it's the state that's filing charges. It's out of your hands.
It's the state that files charges," she would then have a little protection
from his, and sometimes his attorney's, threats. 316
What lessons can we learn from listening to these battered wo-
men? Perhaps the most important lesson is that society must take se-
riously the crime of spousal violence.
V. CONCLUSION-A PROPOSAL
Spousal crime exceptions to spousal immunity, structured in
terms of crimes against a spouse, blur distinctions between tort and
crime,317 leaving it in the hands of the plaintiff victim to bring the
charges, produce the evidence, and ultimately prosecute the case.
Ann Jones concisely states the problem:
Today in the eyes of the law, any assault is both a criminal offense and a
personal tort, or wrong.... But in a great many jurisdictions, even to-
day, a domestic assault is not regarded as a real assault-that is, not
really criminal. When police refuse to arrest, prosecutors to prosecute,
and judges to sentence a man because the victim he assaulted is (or was)
his wife or girlfriend, the state redefines this criminal assault against a
woman as a special category of violence immune from criminal law. The
state magically transforms a crime into a noncrime. 3 8
"Criminal laws are the rules by which we define what we stand for as a
society. ' 319 When criminal behavior such as domestic violence is
treated as only tortious conduct a distinct symbolic injury remains:
315 Corsilles, supra note 4, at 873-74.
316 Testimony of Ms. Peggy Salinas, HPH, THE GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE OF TEXAS FINAL
REPORT, at 70-71 (1994).
317 The line between torts and crime did not always exist. Prior to the Norman Conquest in
the 12th century, English common law addressed "crimes" with the objective of obtaining mone-
tary compensation for victims and their families. See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
W. MAITLAND, TmE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-67 (2d ed. 1968).
318 JONES, supra note 15, at 27-28.
319 Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunci-
ation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REv. 299, 304 (1990).
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"sexual inequality would be symbolically reinforced" by a legal rule
that effectively entitles men to abuse women.3 20
Although domestic violence may fit the definition of crime, the
treatment of this conduct by the legal system suggests that it is less
than criminal. The doctrine of spousal immunity, with its exceptions
structured as "crimes against a spouse," arguably leaves enforcement
in the hands of the individual victim rather than the state. Narrow
judicial interpretation of what constitutes spousal violence, disregard-
ing what we know about battering behavior, ignores the reality of bat-
tered women's lives. Controlling and violent behavior short of
beating one's wife becomes "public harm"-contrasted with the "pri-
vate harm" of wife-beating-and thus outside the spousal violence ex-
ception to spousal immunity.
Those jurisdictions with no spousal crime exception to spousal
immunity feel that they have dealt with the matter appropriately be-
cause their statutes allow the wife to testify voluntarily. These states
overlook the reasons why beaten women are reluctant to testify.
When the battered wife invokes her privilege, we shift our focus from
the battering husband to his victim by blaming her for not leaving and
for not testifying.321 "Focusing on the woman, not the man, perpetu-
ates the power of patriarchy. Denial supports and legitimates this
power; the concept of privacy is a key aspect of this denial." 322 A
spousal immunity rule that gives the wife an election simply leaves her
to be harassed, threatened, and manipulated by her husband into in-
yoking her privilege not to testify. The legal system, once again, tells
the spouses that domestic violence is a private matter in which the
state does not care to intervene.
Mary Cheh suggests that the significance of the criminal law-
and guilt adjudication-is the "public restatement of societal bounda-
ries and a public reinforcement of the concept of individual responsi-
bility. ' '323 She cogently states:
Viewing criminal cases as ceremonies of guilt adjudication may also ex-
plain the disappointment of some groups, such as women.., who con-
sider vindication of harms against them through the civil process as
inadequate. When wife beating is not treated as a crime, but instead as a
matter for mediation or counseling,... society undoubtedly has read-justed its consensus on the moral acceptability of th[is] type .. .of
conduct.324
320 John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 222 (1991). Coffee makes this
point with reference to the crime of rape, but its applicability to domestic violence is readily
apparent.
321 Schneider, supra note 248, at 983.
322 Id.
323 Cheh, supra note 207, at 1359.
324 Id at 1360.
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Elizabeth Schneider has also noted the tendency to relegate domestic
violence to more private and informal processes such as mediation.
She sees this shift as a reflection of the low priority accorded battered
women's problems by the law.325 Relegation of domestic violence to
private, informal, or noncriminal modes of resolution suggests that the
conduct is not serious enough to be treated as a crime. A doctrine of
spousal immunity that characterizes domestic violence as a crime only
if the injured wife chooses to testify similarly suggests that the conduct
is less than criminal, thus diminishing the moral force of the criminal
law. By elevating the desire to preserve a family "haven in a heartless
world, ' 326 the law denies women a safe harbor.
An appropriate spousal immunity statute must allow a spouse's
testimony in the broadest possible circumstances of domestic violence
and must signify the importance of domestic violence to the state by
allowing the state to use all measures to prosecute wrongdoers, includ-
ing compelling a reluctant spouse's testimony. The best solution
would be the abolition of spousal immunity, a step taken by a number
of states.327 For states facing political resistance to such a change,
there are some appropriate middle grounds.
For example, in defining spousal violence for purposes of a
spousal crime exception, a state should consider crimes against prop-
erty as well as crimes giving rise to physical injury. A number of
states, including Oregon, recognize an exception when the crime is
one against the "person or property" of the spouse.328 North Caro-
lina's exception extends to "prosecution for trespass in or upon the
separate lands or residence of the other spouse when living separate
and apart from each other .... -329 States should consider crimes
against persons other than the spouse, who are often victimized be-
cause of the batterer's attempts to control his wife. For example, West
Virginia has drafted an exception for crimes against "child, father,
mother, sister or brother" of a spouse.330 California includes any rela-
tive, as well as a cohabitant, of either spouse.331
There is no appropriate substitute for the state's power to compel
a reluctant spouse. The true value is not in the exercise of such power,
but in the ability to exercise it. Prosecutors will not be jailing victims
for contempt on a regular basis because most victims will likely testify
325 Schneider, supra note 248, at 988-89.
326 See supra note 251.
327 See supra note 153.
328 OR. REv. STAT. § 40.255 (1993).
329 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986).
330 W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966).
331 CAL EVID. CODE § 972 (West 1995). A California court of appeal has interpreted "co-
habitant" to include a female roommate of the wife. People v. Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 352-
53 (Ct. App. 1993). The court noted that "cohabitation means simply to live or dwell together in
the same habitation; evidence of lack of sexual relations is irrelevant." Id. at 353.
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when told they must.332 Further, batterers who can no longer rely on
force or their persuasive powers to make the victim invoke the privi-
lege will be more likely to accept a plea bargain offer from the prose-
cution. In such a case, there would be no need for the victim's
testimony.
Maryland, which did not have a spousal violence exception until
1994, has achieved something of a compromise with an exception that
reads as follows:
The spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to
testify as an adverse witness unless the charge involves: ...
(2) Assault and battery in which the spouse is a victim if:
(i) The person on trial was previously charged with assault and bat-
tery of the spouse;
(ii) The spouse was sworn to testify at the previous trial; and(iii) The spouse refused to testify at the previous trial on the basis of
the provisions of this section.333
While Maryland has created an "every dog gets one bite" rule (a bite
that may be fatal), this may be a compromise acceptable to those re-
maining states that do not allow compulsion of the wife's testimony. 334
A change in the evidentiary rule of spousal immunity cannot, by
itself, solve the problem of domestic violence. Nor can criminal prose-
cution, by itself, solve the problem. But the fact that the criminal jus-
tice system cannot solve a problem is not usually accepted as a
justification for lawlessness. Stringent criminal intervention, together
with social service responses, holds the most promise for a cure.335
Existing policies of spousal immunity hamper criminal intervention.
But perhaps more importantly, the existence of the privilege perpetu-
ates the notion that spousal violence is a private matter between the
spouses to which the criminal law does not really apply. The law is an
important social force-it can lead as well as follow. We cannot ig-
nore the symbolic value of the law.
332 For example, in Michigan v. Ellis, 436 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. 1988), the husband was charged
with kidnapping and raping his wife. At trial, the wife indicated that she did not want to testify
against her husband because she was afraid of how her husband would react and because she
had received a threatening letter from him. When instructed that she must testify, she did so. Id.
at 384. But see Ohio v. Karnes, No. WD-81-24, 1981 WL 5749 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1981)
(unpublished opinion) (finding wife in direct contempt of court and ordering her to be jailed
until she was willing to, and did, testify in a pending domestic violence case against her husband).
333 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1995).
334 Of course, the Maryland spousal violence exception needs to be expanded to include
crimes other than assault and battery.
335 Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 3, at 1520 (suggesting combined efforts
of public education; criminal intervention, including strict enforcement and stringent punish-
ment; and social service responses to address the problem of domestic violence; and noting how
effective this strategy was in efforts to curb drunk driving).
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